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10 Corporate Taxation: The General Franchise Tax
Jorge Martinez-Vazquez and Martin Grace1
C U R R E N T  ST R U C T U R E
The franchise tax is actually composed of two alternative taxes, one falling 
on net income and the other falling on net worth. The net worth statute dates 
from 1903 and has not been revised since 1936. Corporations in Ohio must 
compute both the tax on a net worth basis and the tax on a net income basis 
and pay the higher of the two. In any case the tax paid cannot be less than a 
minimum tax of $50. Ohio banks and other depository financial institutions 
pay a modified franchise tax only on a net worth basis, but at a higher tax rate. 
The franchise tax on financial institutions is discussed in Chapter 11 of this 
book. Ohio corporations pay an additional “litter tax” in two tiers, although 
the second tier is paid only by “litter stream” companies.
These are some of the most important features of the corporate franchise 
tax:
• Relative importance. The franchise tax is the third most important 
source of tax revenue in the state of Ohio. However, this tax represents 
a relatively small share of total general revenues. As shown in Figure 
10-1, 1993 revenues from the corporate franchise tax represented 7.7 
percent of total revenues. By comparison, in the same year the per­
sonal income tax raised 40.7 percent of total revenues and the sales tax 
raised 36.3 percent.
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Sales and Use
36.3%
Personal Income 
40.7%
Source: Ohio Department of Taxation
FIGURE 10-1. Ohio 1993 general revenues by type as a percentage o f total 
general revenue.
Public Utility 
5.9%
Other Revenue
cigarette 
2.4% 
Other Taxes 
4.4%
• Volatility o f  tax revenues. Tax liabilities from the corporate franchise tax 
for the last ten years are presented in Table 10-1. Several things are no­
ticeable from this time series. First, although over the past ten yean 
the two taxes on net worth (the general net worth franchise tax and the 
tax on financial institutions) have had some ups and downs, for the 
most part revenues have increased steadily. Some of the variability of 
the general net worth tax has been produced by the dual nature of the 
tax. In years of economic expansion more firms had higher net in­
comes and therefore paid the net income tax rather than the net worth 
tax. The time series for the net income tax reflects the volatility of its 
tax base (profits) over the business cycle. Revenues from the corporate 
net income tax have moved with the business cycle. Profits are by far 
the most volatile component of the state’s gross income. Con­
sequently, revenues from corporate income taxes are less reliable than 
those coming from other taxes, including the personal income tax, 
sales tax, and property tax. The instability of the net income tax has im­
posed a roller coaster effect on the overall collections from the fran­
chise tax, as illustrated in Figure 10-2. The peaks and valleys in tax 
collections in Figure 10-2 are quite pronounced, even though they are 
expressed in real terms (constant 1987 prices).
TABLE 10-1
Total Corporate Franchise Tax Liability, Tax Years 1983—1993
Liability Before L itter Tax, Surtax and Credits* 
Non-Financial Institutions
Liability After Litter Tax, Surt ax and Credits
Tax
Year
Minimum ($50) 
Taxpayers
Net W orth 
Taxpayers
Net Income 
Taxpayers Total
Non-financial
Institutions
Financial
Institutions Total
1983 $11,404,800 $147,735,230 $332,041,840 $491,181,870 $486,431,925 $37,405,560 $523,837,485
1984 3,962,800 152.794,129 392,943.381 549,700,310 526,520,864 98.853,844 625,374,708
1985 3.480,493 144,100,946 522,502,099 670,083,538 661,568,822 98,650,431 760,219,253
1986 3,418,864 156,793,269 539,368,861 699,580,994 695,018.816 93,705.954 788,724,770
1987 2.783,324 172,179,120 490,115,343 665,077,787 630.587,449 104,670,239 735.257.688
1988 3,003,242 168,554,036 542,200,372 713,757,650 666,389,890 109,640,240 776.030,130
1989 2,835,850 163,646.944 598,482,693 764.965.487 722,042,029 130,125,260 852.167,289
1990 3,031,624 182,506.786 537,005,053 722,543,463 684.708,345 142,896,321 827,604,666
1991 3.614,626 202,190,495 444,733,217 650,538,338 609.690,068 147,271,175 756,961,243
1992 3.719,592 224.748,796 385,027,710 613,496,098 580,451.785 157,912,202
738,363.987
1993 2,501.161 228,158,717 401,836,889 632,4%,767 615.784.545 173,074,954 788,859.499
Source: Ohio Department of Taxation.
♦Only liability BEFORE litter tax. surtax and credits can be identified by type of tax base (net worth or net income) for non- 
financial institutions. Liability for financial institutions, which pay tax based on net worth only, can only be identified A FI ER 
credits.
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• Shifting importance o f net income and net worth taxes. The net worth tax 
component of the franchise tax has played an increasing role in over­
all revenues since the late 1980s as documented in Figure 10-3.
YearsSource: Ohio Department of Taxation.
Note: Deflator from Economic Report of the President except 1993;
1993 deflator estimated using Survey o f Current Business.
FIGURE 10-2. Real corporate franchise tax collections (1987 dollars: millions).
too
■Net Worth H N et Income
Years
Source: Ohio Department of Taxation.
Note: Totals do not add to 100% due to minimum ($50) taxpayers.
FIGURE 10-3. Liability ofN . W. taxpayers vs. N.I. taxpayers as a percentage of 
total corporate tax liabilities.
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• Tax payments are concentrated from a small group o f taxpayers. 
Although the concentration of tax payments by a relatively small group 
of taxpayers is common to other taxes, corporate income taxes have 
traditionally been more concentrated than other taxes. Ohio’s corpo­
rate franchise tax is not an exception to this rule. As shown in Figure 
10-4, over 80 percent of the net worth tax in 1993 was paid by 10 per­
cent of the taxpayers. The level of concentration was almost as high for 
the net income tax. The highest decile of taxpayers paid just a little 
under 80 percent of total net income collections (Figure 10-5).
St ru c t u re  o f  t h e  Ta x
Nexus. The franchise tax is levied on Ohio and non-Ohio corporations for 
the privilege of doing business in the state. The presumption of the general 
obligation to pay franchise tax in Ohio is established by doing business in
FIGURE 10-4. Net worth tax paid 1993 by net worth deciles.
FIGURE 10-5. Net income tax paid 1993 by net worth deciles.
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Ohio, owning capital or property in the state, or holding a charter authoriz­
ing the corporation to do business in Ohio.2
Scope o f the general franchise tax. Besides all C corporations, agricultural 
cooperatives (Chapter 1729 corporations) and business trusts are also 
required to file the franchise tax. An S corporation is not subject to the fran­
chise tax unless it functioned as a C corporation for part of the tax year. 
Other corporations not subject to the franchise tax include public utilities3 
(which are required to pay an excise tax on gross receipts under Chapter 
5727 of the ORC), insurance companies (which pay a premium tax and are 
required to file annual reports with the Superintendent of Insurance), and 
“dealers in intangibles” (which also pay a separate tax).4
Holding companies must file the Supplemental Franchise Tax Schedules 
for holding companies of insurance companies, public utilities, and financial 
institutions, if the holding company owns at least 25 percent of the issued 
and outstanding shares of common stock of one or more financial institu­
tions, or if the holding company owns at least 80 percent of the issued and 
outstanding shares of common stock of one or more public utilities or insur­
ance companies.
C o m p u t a t io n  o f  t h e  t a x
The franchise tax must be computed by all corporations obliged to file a 
return on both bases, net income and net worth. The statutes for the fran­
chise tax in the Ohio Revised Code (ORC) are often the subject of inter­
pretation by the Tax Commissioner’s rulings and opinions, the decisions of 
the Ohio Board of Tax Appeals, and the Ohio Supreme Court. The main 
steps in the computation of corporate franchise tax liability for 1994 are 
summarized in Table 10-2.
C o m p u t a t io n  o f  t h e  N e t  I n c o m e  Ta x
1. Tax base. The initial base for the net income tax is federal taxable in­
come, before net operating loss deduction and special deductions. Of 
course, the amounts reported on the federal tax forms and the Ohio 
adjustments to federal taxable income are subject to verification and 
audit by the Ohio Department of Taxation.
2. Adjustments to federal taxable income. Federal taxable income is ad­
justed by several additions and deductions. The additions are only for 
the valuation limitation on losses from capital (or 1231 assets) and 
losses from the sale of Ohio public obligations. The deductions are 
more substantial but fairly standard. They include: valuation limitation
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TABLE 10-2
Computation of Corporation Franchise Liability for 1994
A. Net Income Basis
l . Federal Taxable Income
plus additions
minus deductions (foreign income, dividends, U.S. interest, other)
2. Base Income
minus allocable income everywhere
3. Apponionable Income
times (income) apportionment ratio (4 factors: property, payroll, double weighted sales)
4. Apportioned Income 
plus Ohio allocable Income
minus Ohio NOL 
plus Other adjustments (related entity, transfer on corporation)
5. Ohio Taxable Income 
times 0.051 for first $50,000 and
0.089 for income over $50,000
6.Ohio Tax on Net Income
B. Net Worth Basis
l. Total Net Worth 
Sum of capital stock (less treasury stock) 
plus retained earnings and additional paid-in capital 
plus reserves and deferred taxes
2. Minus Exempted Assets 
(including: goodwill, appreciation, and other)
3. Equals Net Value of Stock 
times (net worth) apportionment ratio (2 factors: total assets and receipts)
4. Taxable Net Worth 
times 0.00582
C. Final Tax Liability
1. Franchise Tax Due (the largest of)
Net income or net worth basis
2. plus Tier One and Tier Two Litter Taxes
3. Total Tax Due
minus non-refundable credits (investment in subsidiaries, export sales, qualifying investment) 
minus refundable credits (new jobs, qualifying investment) and advanced payments
4. Balance Due (or Overpayment)
518 A B L U E P R I N T  F O R  TAX R E F O R M
on gains from capital (or 1231 assets), gains from the sale of Ohio pub­
lic obligations, dividends received, interest from Ohio public obliga­
tions, and net interest from United States obligations.5
Ohio corporations are allowed to deduct net income from foreign 
sources. However, this deduction was amended in 1991 to limit it in 
some cases to a percent of the foreign source income. The rationale 
was that some of the operating expenses deducted by the corporation 
are also attributable to foreign income. In particular, O RC  section 78, 
foreign dividend gross-up, and ORC  section 951 (subpart F) are de­
ductible in full. However, foreign dividends of affiliated corporations 
that do not transact or hold assets in the USA can be deducted by 85 
percent, and foreign royalties can be deducted by 90 percent. Income 
from technical services performed in the United States for a foreign 
firm is not at all deductible.
3. Allocable income. The Ohio corporate franchise tax, as in many other 
states, distinguishes between allocable income and apportionable in­
come. Allocable income is either entirely included or entirely excluded 
from the tax base of the corporate income tax in the state. In the case 
of apportionable income, part of the income is included in the base by 
using an apportionment formula reflecting how much of the corpora­
tion’s business is transacted in the state.
Ohio statutes make no distinction between business and nonbusi­
ness income in the designation of allocable income. The issue of what 
income is allocable versus apportionable has often been the subject of 
appeals by taxpayers because allocated income, unlike apportioned in­
come, enters the tax base at 100 percent.6 The following types of in­
come are fully allocable to the state of Ohio: net rents and royalties 
from real property located in the state and from tangible personal 
property utilized in the state, capital gains and losses from the sale of 
property located in the state, and dividends which are not otherwise 
deducted or excluded from net income.7 Also, net patent, franchise, 
and copyright royalties and technical assistance fees are allocable to 
Ohio to the extent that the activity takes place in Ohio, and that they 
do not constitute the corporation’s principal source of income.8
4. Apportionable income and formula. A  large number of corporations 
with an obligation to file a corporate franchise tax return in Ohio do 
business in other states besides Ohio. This raises the necessity of de­
termining what part of the corporation’s net income ought to be taxed 
in the state of Ohio. Except for those income items that are considered 
directly allocable to Ohio or other states, all other income derived by 
the corporation is apportioned to the state of Ohio using a conven­
tional three factor formula based on property, payroll, and sales, but
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with the sales factor double-weighted. The composition of the formula 
is illustrated in Table 10-3.
5. Taxable income. In order to arrive at Ohio taxable income for the cor­
poration, the sum of the apportioned income and allocable income 
within Ohio is first adjusted by the income or losses of transferor cor­
porations and “related entity and related member” from combined re­
ports. The second adjustment is for net operating losses.
6. Net operating losses. In the calculation of the net income tax, corpora­
tions are allowed to take a deduction for net operating losses (NOLS) 
realized in past periods. NOLS are allocated and apportioned, inside 
and outside Ohio, for the year in which the NOLS have occurred in the 
same manner that net income would have been allocated and appor­
tioned. NOLS incurred in or after 1982 can be carried forward for 15 
consecutive years, starting the year after the NOL occurred.9 There is 
no carry back provision.
TABLE 10-3 
Net Income Apportionment Formula
Ohio Apportioned m Total Net Corporation x Property + Payroll + Sales + Sales Factors 
Net Income Apportionable Income 4 ’
•Reduced by number o f factors with a denominator o f zero.
The factors are computed as follows:
Average cost o f owned or rented real and tangible 
personal property used in business in Ohio 
Property Factor Average cost o f such property used everywhere
Payroll F a a o r "  -  To,al comPfn3a,ion P°id in 0i" ? -  Total compensation paid everywhere
r . _ • • • Sales in Ohio Sales Factor - Sales everywhere
'Excludes cost o f pollution control, coal conversion, solid waste energy conversion, thermal efficiency 
improvement, energy conversion facilities, property that generates rental income, property in a qualified facility 
in an enterprise zone, and property used exclusively for qualified research in Ohio.
Excludes compensation to certain employees at a qualified facility in an enterprise zone, and compensation to 
employees engaged in qualified research in Ohio.
For sales o f tangible personal property, sales inside and outside o f Ohio are determined by the final destination 
of the property sold; other sales are sitused according to where the income-producing activity takes place. Sales 
derived from allocable income are not included in this factor.
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One peculiarity of the dual nature of the Ohio franchise tax is that the 
carry forward of losses is of no benefit in the computation of the alternative 
net worth tax that corporations may have to pay even in those years in which 
they have made positive net income.
C o m p u t a t io n  o f  t h e  N e t  W o r t h  Ta x
1. Tax base. The tax base for the net worth tax is computed as the total 
book value of the corporation’s capital, surplus, retained earnings, and 
reserves. The value of the corporation’s issued and outstanding shares 
of stock for the purposes of the net worth tax is based on the book 
value kept according to generally accepted accounting principles.10
2. Exempted assets.. Certain assets are exempt from the base of the net 
worth, including “goodwill,” appreciation, land used in agriculture, re­
search facilities, and pollution-and-energy-saving assets after certifica­
tion by the Tax Commissioner. Goodwill is the cost in excess of fair 
value of the net assets acquired.11 The list of currently exempt assets is 
in Box 10-1.
3. Net worth apportionment formula. Many of the corporations liable for 
the net worth tax in Ohio are also doing business in other states be­
sides Ohio. The share of the corporation’s net worth subject to tax in 
Ohio is determined through the application of an apportionment for­
mula which is different from the apportionment formula used for net 
income tax purposes. The apportionment formula for net worth is 
based on two single weighted factors; property and “business done” in 
Ohio. This formula is illustrated in Table 10-4.
O t h e r  Ta x e s
There are two litter taxes levied with the franchise tax. These taxes were 
scheduled to expire in 1993 but have been extended through 1995. It is quite 
possible that the state legislature will prolong their lives beyond 1995.
All corporations except “litter stream corporations”, financial institu­
tions, family farm corporations and those paying the minimum tax of $50, 
pay the “ tier one litter tax.” The tax has a cap of $5,00012 and it is computed 
as the larger of the following two bases:
a. Net income basis: the first $50,000 of Ohio taxable income is taxed at 
a rate of 0.11 percent and for taxable income above $50,000 the rate is 
0.22 percent.
b. Net worth basis: Net worth taxable value at a rate of 0.014 percent.
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BOX 10-1
Assets Exempt from The Net Worth Tax
Certain valuation reserves;
Taxes due and payable;
Goodwill, appreciation, and abandoned property;
Specified investments in public utilities, insurance companies, 
and financial institutions in which the taxpayer has ownership 
interests as required by statute (investments and business attrib­
uted to these companies are also eliminated in determining the 
property and business fractions for apportioning net worth);
Certified Ohio pollution control facilities;
Certain facilities designed to convert coal into other fuels or to 
desulphurize coal (assets excluded for 30 years);
Certified Ohio civil defense structures;
Certified Ohio energy conversion, thermal efficiency improve­
ment, and solid waste energy conversion facilities;
Voting stock and participation certificates of production credit 
associations;
Land in Ohio devoted exclusively to agricultural use;
Property within Ohio used exclusively for qualified research;
Qualified improvements to property located in an enterprise 
zone.
(ORC 5709.25, 5709.35, 5709.50, 5709.65, 5733.05, and 5915.29) 
Reproduced from Department of Taxation Annual Report.
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TABLE 10-4 
Net Worth Tax Base Formula
Ohio
Taxable
Value
Total Net Worth 
minus 
Exempted Assets
x Property + Business done factors 
2
The factors are computed as follows:
Pro erry Factor = Depreciated Value o f Ohio Assets* 
Book Value o f Total Assets
_ . _ . Ohio Business done Business Factor «- Total Business done
*Excludes value o f  pollution control, coal conversion, solid waste energy conversion, thermal efficiency 
improvement and energy conversion facilities, goodwill, appreciation, abandoned property, qualified property in 
an enterprise zone, and property used exclusively for qualified research.
**Business done fo r the sale o f tangible personal property is determined by the final destination o f the goods For 
other types o f sales business done is determined according to the situs o f the sales.
The “tier two litter tax” applies only to those corporations that manufac­
ture or sell litter stream products. These are defined to include all types of 
alcoholic beverages, soft drinks, packaging and containers, cigarettes and 
other tobacco products, matches, candy and gum.
The “tier two litter tax” is also computed on the larger of the two alter­
native bases of net income and net worth. The rates are double those of the 
“tier one litter tax”. The only exception is for the first $50,000 of net income, 
to which the rate of 0.11 percent is applied. The “tier two litter tax” is 
capped at $10,000.
C r e d it s
First, there is a credit for investment in qualified subsidiaries.13 The ob­
jective of this credit is to address the double taxation of net worth at the par­
ent and subsidiary levels. The credit is for investment in qualified 
subsidiaries when the parent company owns more than 50 percent of the 
capital stock of the subsidiary and when during the fiscal year both parent 
and subsidiary paid the franchise tax on a net worth basis. The credit equals 
the lesser of the following:
• The tax charged on the corporation’s net worth represented by invest­
ments in its subsidiaries.
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• The amount by which the corporation’s net worth tax exceeds its com­
puted (but not paid) net income tax.
• The amount by which the net worth tax of its subsidiaries exceeds the 
computed (but not paid) net income tax.
• The credit for investment in qualified subsidiaries is being phased in 
over a period of six years starting in 1990, according to the following 
schedule:
Tax Year Percentage
1990 25
1991 50
1992 50
1993 50
1994 75
1995 100
Second, there is a credit for qualifying new investment, which has the 
objective of reducing the double taxation of real assets under the franchise 
and property taxes. Corporations may claim a credit against the franchise tax 
liability for the difference between the property tax paid on certain qualify­
ing property and the tax that would have been paid had this property been 
listed at a lower rate set forth in ORC section 5733.061 (B). The credit 
applies to equipment and machinery for manufacturing or refining acquired 
after 1978 and not previously owned and credited by other taxpayers. This 
credit is not refundable, but when the credit exceeds the tax liability it can 
be carried forward for three years provided that the property has not been 
sold.14
Third, there is an export sales credit. This applies to corporations that 
increase their export sales at the same rate they increase their Ohio proper­
ty and/or payroll. The credit can be claimed through the year 2005 and is 
computed on the basis of a formula incorporating the incremental changes 
in export sales and property and payroll factors.
Fourth, there is a “new jobs credit” which is refundable and calculatcd as 
the amount of Ohio income tax that the employer withheld from its employ­
ees times the percentage agreed with the Tax Credit Authority. Rehired or 
laid-off workers called back to work in a new facility or in the production of 
new goods or services qualify for the new jobs credit. This new credit is 
administered by the Tax Credit Authority and the Ohio Department of 
Development.
Fifth, there is a credit for qualified non-retail corporations locating in 
“enterprise zones.” This credit is equal to the amount reimbursed to speci­
fied employees for the cost of day care services (up to a maximum of $300
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per child) plus the amount reimbursed to specified employees for training 
costs (up to a maximum of $1,000 per employee).
Other tax benefits. In addition to the tax credits discussed above, corpora­
tions are eligible for several other tax benefits. Corporations that invest and 
create new jobs in certified enterprise zones can receive several tax benefits 
from the franchise tax, including an employee training credit, a day care 
credit, exclusion of qualifying property and payroll factors for the appor­
tionment of the net income tax, and the exemption of qualifying property 
from the base of the net worth tax. Furthermore, the net book value of prop­
erty within Ohio used exclusively for qualified research activities is excluded 
from the numerators of the apportionment factors for the net income and 
net worth taxes. This property is also treated as exempt in the computation 
of the net worth tax base.
Combined income reporting. At present, the majority of corporations file 
a separate entity tax return. However, taxpayer corporations have the option 
of using a combined report for the apportionment of their incomes to the 
state.15 Combined reports apply only to the net income portion of the fran­
chise tax. No similar option exists for the net worth tax.
More specifically, any corporation subject to the franchise tax that direct­
ly or indirectly controls over 50 percent of the voting stock of other corpo­
ration^) subject to the franchise tax in Ohio may elect to combine incomes 
for the purpose of apportioning income taxes.16 There is no obligation to 
include all the eligible corporations in the combined report, and related sub­
sidiaries may elect to file a combined report without the inclusion of the par­
ent corporation. If related entities are excluded from the combined report, 
the Commissioner requires an explanation for the exclusion.17 Once com­
bined income filing is selected by a group of corporations, they cannot opt 
out without written permission of the Tax Commissioner.18
Finally, the Commissioner may require combined income reporting for a 
group of interrelated corporations if it is felt that a combined report is nec­
essary to properly reflect income and tax liability. Often such rulings have 
been appealed.
D is t r ib u t io n  o f  L ia b il it ie s
The distribution for 1993 of net worth and net income tax payments 
among corporations grouped by level of net worth and by economic sector 
is presented in Tables 10-5 and 10-6, respectively. In 1993 there were 107,824 
filers, of which 84,391 or 78.3 percent were net worth taxpayers, and 23,433 
or 21.7 percent were net income taxpayers. The distribution of taxpayers 
between the two bases contrasts with the distribution of revenues. The net 
worth tax yielded $228 million or 36.2 percent of total franchise tax rev­
enues, while the net income component yielded $402 million or 63.8 percent
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TABLE 10-5
Reported Tax Liability by Tax Base and Net Worth, 1993
Ta* Liability before litter Ta* and Credits
Net Worth
Net Worth 
Payers
Number of 
Filers
Net Income 
Payers
Number of 
Filers
Total
liability
Number
of
Filers
$< 0 SI.062.274 20.646 $27,576,223 1.799 $28,638,497 22.445
0 1 3.457.697 8,885 3.766.570 549 7.224.267 9.434
2 200,000 10.877.777 35.275 21.371.425 12.226 32.249.202 47.501
.'00,001 500.000 11.191.797 7.164 14.698.029 3.001 25.889.826 10,165
S00.001 - 2,500.000 24.690.9«! 6.178 37.390.834 2.695 62.081.815 8.873
. .500.001 - 5.000,000 *.623.498 1.409 19.049.265 742 27.672.763 2.151
5.000,001 - 20.000.000 20.714.086 2.189 48.876.795 1.134 69.590.881 3.323
20.000.001 - 100.000.000 36.719.759 1.612 67.416.587 852 104.136.346 2.464
100,000.001 - 250,000.000 22.950.564 534 39.480.517 238 62.431.081 772
250.000.001 500.000.000 20,978.333 231 29.403.482 93 50.381.815 324
MX).000.001 - 750.000.000 12.415.001 83 14.669.812 39 27.084.813 122
750.000.001 - 1.000.000.000 5.447.423 51 6.142.703 13 11.590.126 64
> 1.000.000.000 48,880.774 134 72.188.481 52 121.069.255 186
TOTAL $228,009,964 84.391 $402,030,723 23.433 $630,040,687 107.824
Net Worth
Litter Taxes, Credits, and Total Reported Liability
Tier 1 * 
Litter Tax
Tier 2* 
litter Tax
New Investment 
Credit
Subsidiary & 
Other 
Credits
Total Liability
$<  0 $304,121 $24,927 $6,002,070 $144,623 $22,820,852
0- 1 66.541 748 103.825 11.064 7,176.667
2 - 200.000 601.314 17.452 331.145 93.381 32.443.442
200.001 • 500.000 606.341 16.298 687.464 53.085 25.771.916
500.001 - 2.500.000 1.390.911 34.720 1.623.866 191.556 61,692.024
2.500.001 - 5.000.000 629.889 13.784 1.195.312 131.125 26.989.999
5.000.001 - 20.000.000 1.400.574 50.968 2.135.724 776.761 68.129.938
20.000.001 - 100.000.000 1.676.883 56.917 3.547.254 1.167.769 101.155.123
100.000.001 - 250.000,000 818.486 35.961 3.790.020 698.033 58.797.475
250.000.001 - 500.000.000 487.287 12.599 3.118.471 924.131 46.839,099
500.000.001 - 750.000.000 237.755 16.821 1.096.816 454.446 25.788.127
'50.000.001 - 1.000.000.000 138.212 7.205 283.147 219.369 11.233.027
> 1.000.000.000 536.361 35.652 7.017.896 2.487.910 112.135.462
TOTAL $8,894,675 $324,052 $30,933,010 $7,353,253 $600,973,151
* Tier 1 Litter Tax is paid by all corporations Tier 2 Litter Tax is paid only by ’litter stream* corporations.
of total revenues. Litter taxes raised $9.2 million in 1993. Total credits 
allowed against the franchise tax in 1993 amounted to $38.3 million, of 
which $30.9 million corresponded to the new investment tax credit.
The distribution of tax liabilities among different firm sizes and econom­
ic groups is better visualized in percentage terms. This is shown in Tables 10-
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TABLE 10-6
Reported Tax Liability by Tax Base and Industry, 1993
Industry
Tax Liability before Litter Tax and Credits
Net Worth 
Payers
Number 
of Filers
Net Income 
Payers
Number 
of Filers
Total
Liability
Number 
of Filen
Agriculture. Forestry S I.216.809 1.146 S I.669.607 380 S2.886.416 1.526
Mining 8.857.777 1.014 3.637.913 173 12.495.690 1.1*7
Construction 7.271.866 7.483 14.951.878 2.165 22.223.744 9.648
Manufacturing 84.341.330 10.431 204.172.971 4.025 288.514.301 14.456
Utilities 21.912.296 3.369 28.796.966 1.019 50.709.262 4.388
Wholesale 17.754.276 6.446 32.419.816 2.318 50.174.092 8.764
Reuil 20.527.571 11.125 46.673.693 3.391 67.201.264 14.516
Finance. Insurance. & Real Estate 31.698.024 9.824 23.424.360 2.470 55.122.384 12.294
Services 22.951.030 23.498 37.946.724 5.787 60.897.754 29.285
Not Classified 11.478.985 10.055 8.336.795 1.705 19.815.780 11.760
TOTAL S228.009.964 84.391 S402.030.723 23.433 S630.040.687 107.824
Industry
Litter Taxes. Credits, and Total Reported Liability
Tier I * 
Litter Tax
Tier 2* 
Litter Tax
New
Investment
Credit
Subsidiary & 
Other Credits Total Liabilit>
Agriculture. Forestry S52.418 S3 36 S8.021 Si .246 $2,929,903
Mining 183.965 860 643.064 105.441 11.932.010
Construction 464.970 5.864 82.770 50.758 22.561,050
Manufacturing 3.678.054 129.536 27.366.195 3.747.747 261.207.949
Utilities 463.486 267 90.612 679.397 50.403.007
Wholesale 913.495 54.012 621.463 560.919 49.959.215
Retail 943.665 106.152 282.134 177.755 67.791.192
Finance. Insurance. Sl Real Estate 820.690 7.683 175.027 1.257.108 54.518.623
Services 1.135.244 13.317 131.323 563.403 61.351.590
Not Classified 238.688 6.025 1.532,401 209,479 18.318.612
TOTAL S8.894.675 S324.052 S30.933.010 S7.353.253 S600.973.I51
* Tier 1 Utter Tax is paid by all corporations. Tier 2 Litter Tax is paid only by 'litter stream* corporations.
7 and 10-8. Smaller firms with a net worth under $500,000 represented 73.6 
percent of all taxpayers, but paid only 10.8 percent of all tax liabilities. Firms 
with net assets over $1 billion represented only 0.17 percent of the total num­
ber of filers, but they accounted for 19.22 percent of all liabilities. Credits also 
tend to be concentrated at the top. Firms with assets over $1 billion claimed 
22.7 percent of new investment tax credits and 33.8 percent of all other tax 
credits. In terms of economic sectors, the manufacturing sector is the largest 
taxpayer, being responsible for 45.8 percent of total tax liabilities even though 
this sector represents only 13.4 percent of the total number of filers.
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TABLE 10-7
Reported Tax Liability by Tax Base and Net Worth 
by Percentage of Total, 1993
Net Worth
Tm  Liability before Litter Tax and Credits
Net Worth 
Pavers
Number of 
Filers
Net Income 
Payers
Number of 
Filers
Total
Liability
Number of 
Filers
S< 0 0 47% 24.46% 6.86% 7.68% 4 55% 20.82%
0- 1 1.52 10.53 0.94 2.34 1.15 875
2 - 200.000 4.77 41 80 5.32 52 17 5.12 44 05
200.001 - 500.000 4 91 8 49 3 66 12.81 4 11 9 43
500.001 - 2.500.000 10 83 7.32 9.30 11.50 9 85 8 23
2.500.001 ■ 5.000.000 3.78 1.67 4.74 3.17 4 39 1.99
5.000.001 - 20.000.000 908 2.59 12.16 4 84 11.05 308
20.000.001 - 100.000.000 16.10 1.91 16.77 3 64 16.53 2.29
100.000.001 -250.000.000 10.07 063 9.82 1.02 9 91 0.72
250.000.001 - 500.000.000 9.20 0.27 7.31 0.40 8 00 0 30
500.000.001 - 750.000.000 5.44 0.10 3.65 0.17 4.30 0.11
750.000.001 - 1.000.000.000 2.39 006 1.53 006 1 84 006
> 1.000.000.000 21.44 0.16 17.96 0.22 19.22 0 17
TOTAL 100.00 100.00 100.00 100 00 100.00 100.00
Net Worth
Litter Taxes, Credits, and Total Reported Liability
Tier 1 * 
Litter Tax
Tier 2* 
Litter Tax
New
Investment
Credit
Subsidiary & 
Other 
Credits
Total
Liability
S < 0 3.42% 7 69% 19.40% 1.97% 3.80%
0- 1 0.75 023 0.34 0.15 1 19
2 200.000 6.76 5.39 1.07 1.27 5.40
200.001 • 500.000 6.82 5.03 2.22 .72 4 29
500.001 - 2.500.000 15.64 10.71 5.25 2.61 10.27
2.500.001 ■ 5.000.000 7.08 4.25 3.86 1.78 4.49
5.000.001 - 20.000.000 15.75 15.73 6.90 10.56 11.34
20.000.001 - 100.000.000 18.85 17.56 11.47 15.88 16.83
100.000.001 - 250.000.000 9.20 11.10 12.25 9.49 9.78
250.000.001 - 500.000.000 5.48 3 89 10.08 12.57 7.79
500.000.001 - 750.000.000 2.67 5.19 3.55 6.18 4.29
750.000.001 - 1.000.000.000 1.55 2.22 0.92 2.98 1.87
> 1,000.000.000 6.03 11 00 22.69 33.83 1866
TOTAL 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100 00
' Tier 1 Li tier Ta* is paid by all corporations Tier 2 Utter Tax ii paid only by 'Inter stream’  corporations
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TABLE 10-8 
Reported Tax Liability by Tax Base and Industry 
by Percentage of Total, 1993
Industry
Tax Liability before Liner Tax and Credits
Net Worth 
Pavers
Number of 
Filers
Net
Income
Pavers
Number
of
Filers
Total
Liability
Number of 
Filers
Agriculture. Forestry 0.53% 1.36% 0.42% 1.62% 0 46% 1.42*
Mining 3.88 1.20 0.90 0.74 1.98 10
Construction 3.19 8.87 3.72 9 24 3.53 895
Manufacturing 36 99 12.36 50.79 17.18 45.79 1341 1
Utilities 9 61 3.99 7.16 4.35 8 05 4.07
Wholesale 7.79 7.64 8 06 9 89 7.96 8 13
Retail 9 00 13.18 11.61 14.47 1067 1346
Finance. Insurance. St Real Estate 13.90 11.64 5.83 10.54 8.75 11.40
Services 10.07 27.84 9 44 24.70 9.67 27 16
Not Classified 5 03 11.91 2.07 7.28 3.15 1091
TOTAL 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 10000 i
Industry
Litter Taxes, Credits, and Total Reported Liability
Tier I * 
Litter Tax
Tier 2* 
Litter Tax
New
Investment
Credit
Subsidiary St 
Other 
Credits Total Liability
Agriculture. Forestry 0.59% 0.10% 0.03% 0 02% 0 49%
Mining 2.07 0.27 208 1.43 1.99
Construction 5.23 181 0.27 0.69 3.75
Manufacturing 41 35 39 97 88 47 50.97 43.46
Utilities 5.21 008 0.29 9.24 8 39
Wholesale 10.27 1667 2.01 7.63 8 31
Retail 10.61 32.76 0.91 2.42 11 28
Finance. Insurance. St Real Estate 9.23 2.37 0.57 17.10 9.07
Services 12.76 4.11 0.42 7.66 10.21
Not Classi Tied 2.68 1 86 495 2.85 3.05
TOTAL 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
* Tier 1 Litter Tax is paid by all corporations. Tier 2 Liner Tax is paid only by ’ litter stream* corporations
CO M PAR ISO N W ITH O TH ER  STATES 
R e v e n u e  P e r f o r m a n c e
Average reliance on the tax. By comparison to other states, Ohio’s use of 
the corporate income tax is below average. This is shown with data for 1991 
in Figure 10-6 where Ohio’s corporate tax collections as a percent of total 
tax revenue are compared to those of the eight top industrial states and to 
the entire United States’ average. The comparison with states in the 
Midwest Region gives similar results (Figure 10-7). In 1991 Ohio was rely-
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OH Avg. CA IL IN Ml N.J. N.Y. N.C. PA U.S. 
Source: Facts & Figures on Government Finances, 1993 
Avg. =  Average for the Top Industrial States 
U.S. =  Average for all States
FIGURE 10-6. 1991 Corporate lax collections as a percentage o f total tax rev­
enue: top industrial states.
OH Avg. IL IN IA KY Ml MN MO Wl U.S.
Source: Tax Foundation, (1994).
Avg. =  Average for the Top Industrial States 
U.S. =  Average for all States
FIGURE 10-7. 1991 corporate tax collections as a percentage o f total revenue: 
Midwest region.
ing less on corporate franchise taxes than all other states in the two groups 
except for Indiana and Missouri.
A different way to compare the performance of Ohio’s franchise tax vis- 
a-vis the average performance for other states is to examine its relative per­
formance or tax effort. The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental 
Relations (AC IR) conducts periodic studies of the tax effort of the states.1'
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Tax effort is defined by the ratio of the hypothetical amount of tax revenue 
that would have been collected had the state used a “representative tax 
system” to the actual collections in the state.20 If a state actually collects 
more under its own tax law than would be collected if the “representative tax 
system” were in place, then the state has a higher than average tax effort. 
Similarly, if the state’s actual tax collections are less than those raised by the 
hypothetical representative tax, then the state’s tax effort is lower than the 
average.
Using this approach to examine Ohio’s corporate franchise tax perfor­
mance, we find that Ohio has made a lower tax effort on the corporate in­
come— net worth tax than the average state in the United States in the period 
1982-1991. In particular, Ohio has had a lower tax effort than any other of the 
ten top industrial states with the exception of Indiana (Figure 10-8).
These findings raise a number of intriguing questions for which we have 
no ready answers. The lower than average performance of the franchise tax 
in Ohio is unexpected for several reasons. The corporate franchise net in­
come tax in Ohio has, as we see below, a base similar to that in most other 
states, and the tax rate for nominal net income is among the highest. In ad­
dition, the Ohio franchise tax has a net worth alternative base which is sub­
stituted for the net income tax when its computation shows a higher liability. 
Practically no other state has this significant lower floor mechanism to en­
sure some amount of revenue.
Two explanations are possible for this puzzle. The first is that Ohio is 
more generous than most other states in granting credits and other tax ben­
efits. Some evidence is presented in this and other chapters of the book that 
Ohio is more generous than the average state in this respect. The second is 
that tax avoidance and evasion are considerably worse in Ohio than in other 
states. However, no data are available to pursue this conjecture.
|•  1982 #1986  41988 *1 99 l|
0
u
i ★
♦ I...t 11• •
# * iz
*
IL  IN KY M I NC NJ NY OH
FIGURE 10-8. Relative tax effort for the corporate franchise tax.
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The trend toward decreasing importance o f the corporate income tax. The 
ups and downs in the revenues from Ohio’s franchise tax from 1983 to 1993 
(Table 10-1 and Figure 10-2), and the general decrease in importance of the 
corporate franchise tax in total tax revenues, mirror the experience of all 
other states in the same period. This is clearly shown in Figure 10- 9, where 
the real (at 1987 prices) corporate franchise tax collections for Ohio are 
compared to the total collections from the corporate income tax for all 
states.21
This pattern of similar behavior in Ohio and the United States is also 
shown in Figure 10-10 which tracks the percent change from year to year for 
both series. However, these two figures also suggest a less pronounced pro­
file in the ups and downs of collections for Ohio than for all states. This is 
most likely due to the dual nature of Ohio’s franchise tax, which makes firms 
pay the highest of the net income tax and the net worth tax components.
The franchise tax has declined in relative importance as a source of rev­
enue over the last ten years. This trend has persisted whether revenues from 
the net worth tax on financial institutions are included or excluded from the 
total (Table 10-9). What are the explanations for the declining importance 
of Ohio’s franchise tax in total revenues? To answer this we will need to ex­
amine causes for the decline in revenues that have been outside the control 
of the state, or, differently put, causes for the decline in revenues that are 
shared with other states. Ohio’s experience with a continuing decrease in the 
importance of the corporate franchise tax does not differ much from that of 
other states with a corporate income tax, or indeed from the experience of 
the corporate income tax at the federal level.
Years
Source: Ohio Department of Taxation.
Note: Deflator from Economic Report of the President.
>
cn
I
FIGURE 10-9. Real corporate franchise tax collections for Ohio vs. all states 
(1987 dollars: Ohio in Millions, Total for all states in billions).
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Source: Ohio Department of Taxation Facts and Tax Foundation, (1994)
FIGURE 10-10. Percent change in actual corporate tax revenues (Ohio vs. 
total for all states).
At the federal level, collections from the corporate income tax have been 
declining since the 1960s, when the corporate income tax represented as 
much as one-fifth of total federal tax revenues. Since the mid-1980s and dur­
ing the 1990s, corporate income tax collections have represented approxi­
mately one-tenth of total federal tax revenues. A  part of this decline is 
associated with policy changes granting more favorable tax treatment to cor­
porations, which started with the investment tax credits of the 1960s and 
culminated with the Accelerated Cost Recovery Act of 1981. The Tax 
Reform Act (TRA) of 1986 was in part an attempt to turn around the de­
clining revenues from the corporate income tax by taking away many of the 
tax advantages granted in the past and reducing capital depreciation al­
lowances, and by introducing an alternative minimum tax.
However, there were offsetting changes in the tax environment after 
1986. Perhaps the most important was the number of corporations that 
elected to organize as S corporations after the 1986 TRA. The relative 
growth in the number of S corporations is commonly identified as a signifi­
cant source of erosion in corporate tax revenues.
The main reason for electing to organize as S corporations is a favorable 
tax treatment. Federal law treats S corporations similarly to partnerships. 
Many states, including Ohio, do the same. The profits (or losses) of S cor­
porations are passed through to shareholders, and taxes are paid only at the 
personal level. In contrast, profits from C corporations are taxed once at the 
company level and taxed again as dividend income or as capital gains at the 
individual level.22 The growth in importance of S corporations is dramatized
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TABLE 10-9
Corporate Franchise Tax Liability as a Percentage of State Tax Revenue
Tax Year
Liability After Litter Tax, 
Surtax and Credits
Excluding Financial 
Institutions Total
1983 8.4912 9.1441
1984 7.9320 9.4213
1985 9.0797 10.4366
1986 9.1934 10.4329
1987 7.7637 9.0524
1988 7.7565 9.0327
1989 8.2534 9.7408
1990 7.5291 9.1004
1991 6.6936 8.3104
1992 6.1629 7.8395
1993 6.1454 7 8726
Source: Ohio Department of Taxation.
by the fact that in 1986 they represented 21 percent of all corporations and 
by 1990 they represented 48 percent. The largest increase happened just 
after TRA 1986 was enacted. However, these numbers may exaggerate the 
importance of S corporations. In terms of net income S corporations repre­
sented only 9.3 percent of total corporate income in 1990; this was up from 
5.9 percent in 1986. In terms of total assets, S corporations arc even less im­
portant. In 1990 they represented 4. 1 percent of total assets in the corpo­
rate sector, up from 1.8 percent in 1986. One reason for this smaller share 
of income and assets is that S corporations tend to be smaller and in the ser­
vice sector (32 percent in 1990).23 However, not all of the decrease in rev­
enues from corporate income taxes can be traced to changes in tax policies. 
It appears that there has also been a persistent downward trend in the rela­
tive importance of the base of the corporate income tax. Auerbach and 
Poterba,24 who have studied the decline in federal corporate income tax rev­
enues, find that while the average rate of corporate taxation had fallen by 
one-third from the mid 1960s to the mid 1980s, in the same period corporate 
profitability had declined by a factor of two. While it has been relatively easy 
to disentangle the causes behind lower average corporate tax rates, to date 
there is no clear understanding of why corporate profitability has decreased 
by so much. The profit rate has trended downward since the 1960s and 
dropped most sharply in the 1980s.25 Many observers associate this sharp
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decrease with the oil crisis that hit at about the same time. The taxable in­
come of many corporations has also decreased through leverage buy-outs 
and other means for relying more heavily on debt financing. In more recent 
years the rate of profitability has turned around, but it has not reached the 
levels of the 1960s or 1970s.
H o w  D if f e r e n t  is  O h io ’s F r a n c h is e  Ta x ?
Nexus. The legal definition and the administrative enforcement of nexus 
in Ohio are broad by national standards. The state of Ohio is more likely to 
consider that nexus exists as a result of non-universal business activities, 
such as the use of a company car for a salesperson or the listing of the com­
pany in the phone book in another state. O f the seven non-universal activi­
ties used by state tax administrations to determine nexus listed in Tabic 
10-10, Ohio is the only state that uses all of them. In particular, Ohio is one 
of only four states that considers the presence of a salesperson who only 
takes orders as evidence of business nexus.26 Ohio’s Department of Taxation 
maintains several permanent offices in other states which help enforce the 
state’s franchise tax.
Apportionment formulas. Ohio uses a three factor, double-weight sales 
formula for the apportionment of net income. The more common appor­
tionment formula is a three-factor formula with sales, payroll, and property 
having the same weights.27 However, ten other states besides Ohio use the 
double-weighted sales factor formula. The formulas used in a selected sam­
ple of states are surveyed in Table 10-11. The accompanying Table 10-12 
summarizes the nature of the modified formulas of all the states not using 
the straight three factor equally weighted formula. Besides the double 
weighting of the sales factor, almost every other modification of the formula 
also involves some other weighting of the sales factor. Three states (Iowa, 
Texas, and Nebraska) use a single-factor sales formula.
Ohio conforms with the practice of many other states by eliminating a 
factor if its denominator is zero but leaving the factor in the formula if the 
numerator is zero (See Table 10-11). Ohio also allows corporations, under 
some particular circumstances, to use separate accounting rather than the 
apportionment formula as a method of apportioning income to the state. " 
As seen in the interstate comparisons in Table 10-11 separate accounting as 
an apportionment method is often completely excluded.
Throwback rule. Ohio does not use a “throwback” rule for the computa­
tion of the sales factor of the apportionment formula for the net income tax. 
Thus, when corporations doing business in Ohio make sales in states with­
out a corporate income tax, those (untaxed) sales enter the denominator of 
the formula (hence some sales are not apportioned to any state). The problem 
with this approach is that it opens an avenue for tax avoidance by “transfer­
ring” sales to the no-tax state. The use of the “throwback” rule would make
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TABLE 10-10 
Non-Universal Activities Used to Determine Nexus
Suie
Licensing
Intangible
Rights
Licensing
of
Software
Company 
Listed in 
Phonebook
Company 
Car for 
Salesperson
Salesperson 
Sets up 
Promotional 
Items
Salesperson 
Takes 
Orders Onlv
Inventory 
Inspection by 
Sal** p e rm
Ohio X X X X X X X
Illinois X X X X X
Indiana X N/R X
low» X X X
Kentucky X X X
Michigan N/R X X
Minnesota X X X X
Missouri X N/R X X X X
Wisconsin
California X N/R X X
Colorado
Florida X X X
Georgia X X X X
Sew Jersey X N/R X X X
New York X X X X
North Carolina N/R
Pennsylvania X
Total of All Other
States 20 12 4 6 16 2 17
Total of All States
I'sini Activity
32 18 9 11 26 4 27
Source: 1993 Multistate Corporate Tax Guide
X These items create nexus 
N/R • No report from this state.
such sales part of the numerator of the sales factor for Ohio purposes. Table 
10-13 surveys the use of the “throwback” rule in a selected group of states.
Tax base. Ohio couples the state franchise net income tax with federal tax­
able income before the net operating loss deduction and special deduc­
tions.29 About half of the states choose to couple their corporate income tax 
bases with federal taxable income, before special deductions; the other half 
couple with federal taxable income after special deductions. See Table 10-14 
for a sample of state practices. Nevertheless, Ohio allows an adjustment de­
duction from taxable income for dividends received and also allows a re­
duction for net operating losses in Ohio.
Ohio allows interest from United States Government securities as a de­
duction from taxable income. However, some states do tax this interest in­
come, as shown in Table 10-15. But in order to tax interest from federal 
securities these states must also tax interest from their own state securities. 
This non-discriminatory clause makes the option of taxing federal income
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TABLE 10-11 
General Formula Apportionment
Stale
Does State 
Follow
UDITPA?
Generally Used Factors
Are the 
Factors 
Weighted 
Equally?
Does State
Allow
Separate
Accounting?
Does State Eliminate Factor if
Sales Property Payroll
Denominator
is
Zero?
Numerator is 
Zero?
Ohio No X X X No* Yes* Yes No
Illinois Yes* X X X No* Yes* Yes No
Indiana No X X X Yes Yes* Yes No
Iowa No X _ _ N/A Yes* N/A N/A
Kentucky Yes* X X X No* No Yes No
Michigan Yes* X X X No* Yes* Yes No
Minnesota No* X X X No* No Yes No
Missouri Yes* X X X Yes Yes* Yes No
Wisconsin Yes* X X X No* Yes* Yes No
California Yes* X X X Yes* Yes* Yes* No
Colorado Yes* X* _ X Yes Yes* No No
Rorida No* X X X No* No Yes No
Georgia No* X X X Yes Yes* Yes No
New Jersey No X X X Yes No Yes No
New York No X X X No* No* Yes No*
North
Carolina
Yes* X X X No* No Yes No
Pennsylvania Yet* X X X Yes Ye»* Yes No
Source: 1993 Multistate Corporate Tax Guide 
* More qualifications apply.
less attractive; nevertheless, it is an option that should be considered. The 
option is especially important if, as discussed in the next chapter, banks and 
other financial institutions are brought under the general regime of the cor­
porate franchise tax. One of the main problems of doing so is that banks and 
other financial institutions tend to have abnormally low net incomes when 
interest from federal securities is exempt.
Tax rates. Only the tax rates for the net income tax are comparable to 
those used in other states, since Ohio is one of few states with a substantial 
(uncapped) net worth tax and the only one in which the net worth tax is paid 
when the liability is larger than under the net income tax. In terms of the net 
income tax, Ohio’s rates are in the upper range of the spectrum. By com­
parison to a selected group of 16 other states shown in Table 10-16, only four 
states have higher rates for corporate net incomes than Ohio. The highest 
rate is charged by Pennsylvania, 12.25 percent. Iowa has a progressive sched­
ule reaching a marginal rate of 12 percent for net incomes above $250,000. 
Closer to Ohio’s rate are Minnesota, with a rate of 9.8 percent, and New 
York, with a rate of 9 percent.
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TABLE 10-12 
States with Modified Apportionment Formulas
State Alternative Formula Effective Dale
Ohio Double-weighted sales factor formula.
Colorado By election, a corporation may use either the two-factor formula
(sales and property) or the equally weighted three-factor formula.
Connecticut Double-weighted sales factor formula.
Florida Double-weighted sales factor formula.
Illinois Double-weighted sales factor formula.
Iowa Single factor sales formula.
Kansas By election, a corporation may use either the equally weighted
three-factor formula or two-factor formula of property and sales (if 
payroll exceeds average of such factors by 200%).
Kentucky Double-weighted sales factor formula.
Massachusetts Double-weighted sales factor formula.
Minnesota Sales weighted 70% and property and payroll weighted 15%each.
Mississippi Manufacturing-retailer uses sales, plus average of property-payroll
(denominator is two) formula. Manufacturer-wholesaler uses 
equally weighted three-factor formula. Single-factor sales formula 
for retailing, renting, servicing and merchandising.
Missouri By election, a corporation may use either the equally weighted
three-factor formula or the single-factor sales formula.1
Nebraska Single-factor sales formuala.
New Hampshire (1.5 sales + 1 property + payroll) -s-3
New York Double-weighted sales factor formula.
North Carolina Double-weighted sales factor formula.
Oregon Double-weighted sales factor formula.
Texas Single-factor sales formula.
West Virginia Double-weighted sales factor formula
Wisconsin______________Double-weighted sales factor formula____________________________
1983
1981
1983
1987
1988
198«
1978
1987
1988
1992
1976
1989
1991
1989
1986
1974
Source: Updated from J. Coalson. “State and Local Corporate Tax Roundup,” Corporate Taxation. Vol. 3, No. 
1., May/June, 1992.
Alternative formula is calculated as: Missouri sales + all other sales times Net income
All sales
Effective date is 1992, with pre-1992 five year phase-in.
Source: Updated from J. Coalson, "State and Local Corporate Tax Roundup," Corporate Taxation, Vol. 3, No. 1., 
May/June, 1992.
Minimum Tax. Several states use an Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT) to­
gether with the regular corporate income tax (Table 10-17). In the selected 
sample of states only New Jersey uses a fixed amount for a minimum tax. 
Other states using a fixed amount minimum tax and not shown in Table 10­
17 are Massachusetts with a flat tax of $456, Connecticut ($250), Vermont ( 
$150), and Utah ($100). Several states in the selected sample do impose a
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TABLE 10-13 
Throwback Rules
Slate Does State's Throwback Rule Apply to Sales?
Ohio NO
Illinois YES. If corporation is not taxable in state where property had 
its situs or was used.
Indiana YES
Iowa NO
Kentucky NO
Michigan YES
Minnesota NO
Missouri YES
Wisconsin YES
California YES
Colorado YES. State where goods were shipped from.
Florida NO
Georgia NO
New Jersey NO
New York NO
North Carolina NO
Pennsylvania NO
Source: 1993 Multistate Corporate Tax Guide.
minimum tax similar to the federal AMT. This is to ensure that corporations 
do not take “excessive” deductions based on tax preferences. Corporations 
need to compute the ordinary corporate income tax and the AMT simulta­
neously. The latter has a wider base but at a lower rate. Corporations are re­
quired to pay the larger of the two. The states of Iowa, New York, California, 
and Florida all have such a tax. However, none of these states uses the com­
putation of the federal AMT to implement its AMT
NOL carryforwards and carry backs. As we have seen in the previous sec­
tion, Ohio allows the carry forward of net operating losses under the net in­
come tax for 15 years and no carry back of losses is allowed. The earn' 
forward provision is almost universal in other states with a corporate income 
tax, and an allowance of 15 years is the norm. Pennsylvania is the exception, 
having eliminated the carry forward provision in 1994. About half of the 
states sampled in Table 10-18 allow the carry back of losses for three years. 
The use of the carry back provision offers a more favorable treatment to 
business but at the same time tends to create more instability in state rev­
enue collections.
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TABLE 10-14 
Conformity to Federal Rules
State
Does State Computation of Taxable Net Income Start 
with a Figure from Federal Form 1120?
Ohio Yes. Starts with taxable income BEFORE special deductions.
Illinois Yes. Starts with taxable income AFTER special deductions.
Indiana Yes. Starts with taxable income AFTER special deductions.
Iowa Yes. Starts with taxable income AFTER special deductions and BEFORE NOL.
Kentucky No.
Michigan Yes. Starts with taxable income AFTER special deductions.
Minnesota Yes. Starts with taxable income BEFORE special deductions.
Missouri Yes. Starts with taxable income AFTER special deductions.
Wisconsin Yes. Starts with taxable income BEFORE special deductions and NOL.
California Yes. Suns with taxable income BEFORE special deductions.
Colorado Yes. Starts with taxable income AFTER special deductions.
Florida Yes. Starts with taxable income AFTER special deductions.
Georgia Yes. Starts with taxable income AFTER special deductions.
New Jersey Yes. Starts with taxable income BEFORE special deductions and NOL on single-entity 
basis and NOL's.
New York Yes. Starts with taxable income BEFORE special deductions.
North Carolina Yes. Starts with taxable income BEFORE special deductions
Pennsylvania Yes. Starts with taxable income BEFORE special deductions
Source: 1993 Multistate Corporate Tax Guide.
Miscellaneous taxes. Ohio is not unique in adding minor miscellaneous 
taxes to the corporate franchise tax. New Jersey, as Ohio, has litter control 
taxes. However, most of the miscellaneous taxes in other states are in the na­
ture of small franchise taxes on capital stock or net worth (Table 10-19).
Tax incentives. Ohio offers a number of incentives with the franchise tax, 
including credits and exemptions, some of which are associated with setting 
up business in an enterprise zone. Ohio is not out of line with many other 
states which offer similar incentives. Most offer incentives for enterprise 
zones. However, Ohio is among the smaller group of states that use the fran­
chise tax rather than sales and income taxes in their incentive programs. 
Ohio is also the only state that reports using exemptions of assets as a form 
of tax incentive to business activity.
Combined income reporting for unitary businesses. Ohio allows combined 
income reporting for a unitary group of corporations as long as the corpo­
rations are all Ohio taxpayers and other conditions are met. There is con-
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TABLE 10-15
Treatment of Federal Obligations (Dividends and Interest)
State U.S. Treasury Bills & Notes
Ohio n
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kentucky
Michigan (No corporate income lax, single business ux only)
Minnesota X
Missouri
Wisconsin X
California X (franchise only)
Colorado
Florida X
Georgia
New Jersey X
New York X
North Carolina
Pennsylvania The deduction for interest income from U.S. obligations is reduced by the 
interest incurred in carrying the securities and the expenses incurred in the 
production of such income.
Source: 1993 Multistate Corporate Tax Guide.
X: Interest income from U.S. Government securities is taxable.
siderable diversity among the states on this issue (Table 10-20). While some 
other states besides Ohio make it optional for the taxpayers to use combined 
reporting and/or the Department of Taxation to require it, there are many 
more states that either require combined income reporting or disallow it 
entirely.
M A IN  ISSUES A N D  PRO BLEM S
T h e  N e t  W o r t h  P o r t io n  o f  t h e  Ta x
How common is the net worth tax or business assets taxes? An alterna­
tive business tax falling on assets or net worth is not all uncommon. In fact,
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TABLE 10-16 
Tax Rates
State Tax Rate
Ohio Greater of ($0 - 50,000 = 5.1 * ;  >  $50,000 - 8 .9*) or (5.82 Mills multiplied 
by net worth; a surtax o f . 11 % on the first $50,000 and .22% over $50T of net 
income or .0014 of net worth).
Illinois 4.0® Corporate Rate
+ 20.0* Surcharge until 1993 (10* after) 
t .  2.5 X PfiBonal Properly Tax 
-  7 .3 *  before 1993
Indiana 3 .4 *  of AGI + 4.5% supplemental net income tax
Iowa $0-25,000 - 6 *
25.001-100,000 -  8 *
100.001-250,000 -  10* 
>  250,000 = 12*
Kentucky $0-25,000 - 4 *
25.001-50,000 «  5 *
50.001-100.000 =  6 *
100.001-200,000 =  7 *  
>  200,000 = 8 *
Michigan 2.35* single business tax
Minnesota 9 .8 *
Missouri $0-100,000 - 5 .0* 
100,001 -335,000 = 6.0* 
>  335,000 = 6 .5*
Wisconsin 7 .9 *  + 5.0* recycling tax until 4/1/99 
(Minimum recycling tax =  $25; Maximum = $9,800)
California 9 .3 * , banks and financial institutions = 10.668*
Colorado $0-50,000 = 5 * ; >  $ 50,000 = 5.1*
Florida 5 .5*
Georgia 6 .0 *
New Jersey 9 .0 *  -1- .375* surcharge which is reviewed annually
New York 9 .0 * ; 8 .0*  graduated rate for small businesses 
+ 10.0* surtax in 1993
North Carolina 7.75* plus surtaxes (1991 = 4 * . 1992 = 3 * )  
(1993 = 2 * . 1994 = 1*)
Pennsylvania 12.25*
Source: 1993 Multistate Corporale Tax Guide.
Ohio is the only state that requires the tax payer to pay the higher of the two 
taxes.30 Several states have a tax on net worth, some of these taxes are 
capped and work as minimum taxes rather than as alternatives to the net in­
come tax. Others such as Pennsylvania have extremely high net worth tax 
rates.31
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TABLE 10-17 
Alternative Minimum Tax
State
Does State Impose 
a Minimum Tax?
Is State-Imposed 
AMT Similar to 
Federal AMT?
What is State's 
AMT Rate?
Ohio Yes No $50
Illinois No N/A N/A
Indiana No N/A N/A
Iowa Yes Yes 7.2%
Kentucky No N/A N/A
Michigan No N/A N/A
Minnesota Yes Yes, With 
Modifications
5.8%
Missouri No N/A N/A
Wisconsin No N/A N/A
California Yes Yes 7%
Colorado No N/A N/A
Florida Yes No 3.3%
Georgia No N/A N/A
New Jersey Yes, Flat fee: 
$25 domestic, 
$50 foreign
No N/A
New York Yes Yes 5%
North Carolina No N/A N/A
Pennsylvania No N/A N/A
Source: 1993 Multistate Corporate Tax Guide.
There are a number of ways to look at the net worth tax and compare 
across states. First, one could examine the percentage of corporate taxes 
raised through the net worth tax. By including the financial services tax as 
part of the net worth tax, Ohio raises almost 50.1 percent of its corporate tax 
revenues from the net worth tax (Table 10-1). No other state raises as much 
as a proportion to total corporate tax revenues. However, other states such 
as Pennsylvania taxes its corporations heavily through a 12.25 percent net 
worth tax. This is a much higher rate than Ohio’s and potentially much more 
burdensome.
The General Franchise Tax 543
TABLE 10-18 
Net Operating Loss Carry Forwards and Carry Backs
State Carry Backs Allowed?
No. of Y ean
Carry Forwards Carry Backs 
Allowed? Allowed
No. of Years Carry 
Forwards Allowed
Ohio No Yes (Ohio loss only) N/A IS
Illinois Yes Yes 3 IS
Indiana Yes Yes 3 IS
Iowa Yes Yes 3 IS
Kentucky Yes Yes 3 IS
Michigan No. N OL is termed 
‘ business loss. ‘
Yes. NOL is termed N/A 
‘business loss’
10
Minnesota No Yes N/A IS
Missouri Yes Yes 3 IS
Wisconsin . No Yes N/A IS
California No Yes N/A IS
Colorado No Yes N/A IS
Florida No Yes N/A IS
Georgia Yes Yes 3 IS
Sew Jersey No Yes N/A 7
New York Yes. limited to first 
S10T o f loss for each 
year.
Yes, SAF. except limited 3 
to first S10T of loss.
IS
North Carolina No Yes. net economic loss. N/A 5
Pennsylvania None allowed after the 
1991 tax year.
Source. 1993 Multistate Corporate Tax Guide.
Alternative taxes on assets or net worth have become more popular 
around the world over the last decade, but still are far from common.32 Some 
European countries have such a tax. Germany levies a net assets tax with a 
rate between 0.6 and 0.75 percent, and this tax is not allowed as a deduction 
or a credit from the regular corporate income tax. Austria has a net asset tax 
with a rate of 1.35 percent, but this tax is allowed as a deduction from the 
regular corporate income tax. Norway uses a 0.3 percent tax on net assets, 
and no deduction is allowed from the corporate income tax.
Business taxes on assets have become particularly popular in Latin 
America.33 Mexico implemented an alternative asset tax five years ago and 
since then many other countries in Latin America such as Argentina and 
Venezuela, have introduced some form of business asset tax. However, in 
Latin America this type of tax is actually used as an administrative measure 
for controlling evasion when the tax administration apparatus cannot make 
the corporate income tax work properly.34 For this reason, asset taxes are al-
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TABLE 10-19 
Miscellaneous Taxes on Business Activities
State Name o f Tax Tax Base Tax Rate Schedule
Ohio Two tier litter tax
Illinois Various N/R N/R
Indiana Gross Income Tax All gross receipts of a taxpayer 
with special exemptions and/or 
deductions
Varies
Iowa N/A
Kentucky Corporation License Tax Capital employed .21%
Michigan N/A
Minnesota N/A
Missouri N/A
Wisconsin N/R N/R N/R
California N/A
Colorado N/A
Florida Intangibles Tax Stocks, bonds, value of 
receivables on 1/1
1.5 mills.
Georgia Net Worth Tax Net Worth $10 Minimum to $5,000 on net 
worth in excess of $22 million
New Jersey Litter Control Tax N/R N/R
Gross Income Tax 
Withholding
N/R N/R
Spill Compensation Tax N/R N/R
New York Fixed Dollar Minimum Predetermined dollar amounts, 
based on gross payroll
Varies
Capital Allocated business and 
investment capital
1.78 mills per $1 of allocated 
capital; .9 mills per $1 
allocated subsidiary capital
Organization Tax Authorized and issued capital 
stock
.05 of 1 % of par value; 5 cents 
per share of no par stock
North Carolina Franchise Tax Capital stock, surplus, and 
undivided profits
$1.50 per $1,000
Pennsylvania Capital Stock/Franchise Tax Fixed formula variation of 
capital stock
13 mills
Source: 1993 Multistate Corporate Tax Guide.
most always used as alternative minimum taxes creditable against the regu­
lar corporate income tax and often can be carried forward as a credit for sev­
eral years.35
Advantages o f a net worth or business assets tax. The most important ad­
vantage of the net worth tax is that it has provided the state with a more sta­
ble source of revenues over the years. The data in Table 10-21 show
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TABLE 10-20 
Unitary Business
State
Treatment of Unitary 
Business Combinations
Does Unitary Business 
Include Worldwide 
Activities?
Is i  Water's-Fdge Unitary 
Method Available?
Ohio Optional only if the unitary members are 
Ohio taxpayers.
No Yes. upon arrival
Alabama Not Allowed N/A N/A
Alaska Required Yes. until 1-92 for non­
oil cos.
Yes. After 1-92
Arizona Required No No
Arkansas Not Allowed N/A N/A
California Required Yes Yes
Colorado Required No Yes
Connecticut Allows taxpayer to petition for an 
alternative allocation method
N/A N/A
Delaware Not Allowed N/A N/A
Florida Not Allowed N/A N/A
Georgia Optional. State can force Unitary. 
Taxpayer cannot elect to apply it.
No No
Hawaii Required State s option only No Yes
Idaho Required Yes Yes
Illinois Required No (Yes before 1982) No (Waters-Edge after 1982)
Indiana Optional for state and taxpayer Yes (Taxpayer's option) Yes
Iowa Not Allowed N/A N/A
Kansas Required No No
Kentucky Optional for state and taxpayer No Yes (All applications of 
unitary treatment)
Louisiana Not Allowed N/A N/A
Maine Required No No
Maryland Not Allowed N/A N/A
No No
Michigan No No
Minnesota No No
No No
Missouri N/A N/A
Montana Required Yes
Yes (3-year renewable 
period)
Nebraska No No
Nevada
New
Hampshire
Required No. (Dividends from 
foreign unitary affiliates 
are taxed after a foreign 
factor relief.)
No. (Water's-Edge is 
required.)
continued
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TABLE 10-20 (continued) 
Unitary Business
Slate Treatment of Unitary 
Business Combinations
Does Unitary Business 
Include Worldwide 
Activities?
Is a Water s-Edge Unitary 
Method Available?
New Jersey Not Allowed N/A N/A
New Mexico Optional for taxpayer. State cannot force. No No
New York Optional for state and taxpayer. Yes. Alien corporations 
not included.
No
North Carolina Not Allowed N/A N/A
North Dakota Required. Commissioner may require or 
permit unitary treatment.
Yes Yes
Oklahoma Optional for state No Yes
Oregon Required No No. Required by state
Pennsylvania Not Allowed N/A N/A
Rhode Island N/A N/A N/A
South Carolina Not Allowed N/A N/A
South Dakota No corporate tax
Tennessee Optional for state No Yes
Texas Not Allowed N/A N/A
Utah Required If taxpayer elects. Yes
Vermont Required. Note that unitary reporting for 
Vermont is NOT combined reporting
No No
Virginia Not Allowed N/A N/A
Washington No corporate Tax
West Virginia Taxpayer may request or state may force. No Yes. after formal request by 
taxpayer
Wisconsin Not Allowed. All corporations are taxed 
as separate entities.
N/A N/A
Wyoming No corporate tax
D C . Not Allowed N/A N/A
Source: 1993 Muitistate Corporate Tax Guide.
liabilities for the corporate franchise tax from 1988 to 1993, together with 
what the tax liability would have been had there been no net worth tax com­
ponent in the present franchise tax. O f course, without adjustment of rates, 
revenues from the franchise tax would have been lower. But what is more 
important, revenues would have been less stable. The rate of change (posi­
tive or negative) from period to period is often twice as much for the fran­
chise tax without the net worth tax as for the franchise tax with the net worth 
tax. The higher relative instability in the franchise tax without its net worth 
component is reflected in a coefficient of variation for this series that is dou­
ble the size of the coefficient of variation for the series including the net
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TABLE 10-21 
Corporate Franchise Tax Liability With and Without 
Net Worth Tax Component, 1988-1993
Tax Year
Total with Net 
Worth
Percent Change over 
Previous Year
Total without Net Worth: 
Net Income Basis Only
Percent Change over 
Previous Year
1988 $719,430,413 - $586,959,047 —
1989 771.130.137 7.2 645.077.393 9.9
1990 728.156.622 -5.6 585.163.816 -9.3
1991 650.538.338 •10.7 461.164.160 •21.2
1992 613.496.098 -5.7 429.994.616 •6 8
1993 630.040.000 2.7 422.805.000 •1.7
Coefficient of 
Variation* 0.083 — 0.166 —
Sources: Ohio Department of Taxation. Annual Report and our own computation.
‘Computed on the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean value in the series.
worth tax. Thus, recent data confirm the intuition that the net worth com­
ponent of the franchise tax adds stability to overall tax revenue collections.
Are there any other positive side benefits of the net worth tax? The other 
main advantage of taxes on net worth or assets is, as we have seen, as an ad­
ministrative measure to control tax evasion and aggressive avoidance. 
Several other arguments have been used in defense of these taxes, but none 
is strong or completely convincing.
In the case of a closed economy with little mobility of capital, an asset tax 
tends to have the same effect as a land tax. It gives an incentive to owners of 
capital to put capital to its most productive use. One can hardly afford own­
ing capital that is not being used to its full potential. But this argument 
hardly applies to Ohio or any other state because the economy is fully open 
and capital is mobile. In an open economy with capital mobility, the tax on 
net worth will encourage the exit of capital from the state or retard the entry 
of new capital. To the extent that Ohio taxes capital more heavily than other 
states (in a combination of property, net worth, and corporate income 
taxes), then state residents (either as consumers, workers, or owners of land) 
will tend to pay for the heavier capital taxation. Their payment may take the 
form of higher prices, lower wages, and lower prices of land or other fixed 
inputs.
Some economists have supported the idea of a tax on fixed assets because 
all marginal profits become tax exempt and economic activity is thus en­
couraged. But this does not apply to the Ohio franchise tax because higher 
marginal profits will eventually trigger the net income tax. Also important in 
the long run is the fact that capital assets are not fixed and; consequently, a 
net worth tax is not free of distortions. On the administrative side, asset
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taxes reduce the ability of interstate and international companies to do tax 
planning or transfer pricing schemes to reduce their tax liabilities.
Finally, an additional benefit of a net worth tax is its (potential) simplic­
ity. This is a main reason why the tax has become more popular in develop­
ing economies. Tax administration in developing countries tends to be 
weaker, with limited capabilities to audit, for example, sophisticated tax 
companies. Taxing net worth is attractive because the tax base is easier to 
recognize by tax auditors and revenue collectors. As an economy develops, 
presumably the tax administration, itself, becomes more sophisticated and is 
better able to administer and audit income taxes, including those of larger 
multinational corporations.
Disadvantages o f a net worth tax. The major problem with Ohio’s corpo­
rate franchise tax is its net worth component. The unpopularity of the net 
worth tax among taxpayer corporations, as we will see, is not surprising. The 
net worth component has caused more litigation problems than any other 
aspect of the franchise tax. The most important criticisms and shortcomings 
of the net worth tax are examined in the following paragraphs.
The list of criticisms and shortcomings of the net worth tax is a long one. 
First, taxpayers feel that the net worth tax is unfair because it puts an addi­
tional burden on those companies that have had a bad year, with low income 
or net losses. The tax comes at a time when enterprises are least able to af­
ford it, and thus it increases their financial risk. This may be particularly 
damaging to new companies, which often have several years of losses.35 In 
1993, $158 million was paid in net worth taxes (out of a total of $228 million) 
by corporations with zero or negative net incomes.
Second, the tax is horizontally inequitable because it depends on the 
structure of the business. Some business sectors may require more (or 
fewer) capitalization for technological reasons and consequently more (or 
less) risk and maturation periods for profit-making. In this sense, the net 
worth tax can be viewed as discriminatory— favoring enterprises that are 
lightly capitalized, such as those in the service sector, and penalizing enter­
prises more heavily capitalized, such as those in the manufacturing sector. 
Both types of companies would pay the net income tax in years of good per­
formance, but in a recession those sectors that are more heavily capitalized 
may pay a much higher net worth tax.
Third, the net worth tax discriminates against companies with headquar­
ters in Ohio. This arises from the fact that the property factor of the appor­
tionment formula for the net worth tax situses to Ohio intangible assets such 
as bank deposits, investments in other businesses, and securities that the 
corporation owns outside Ohio. This penalty is more serious for the parent 
or holding companies domiciled in Ohio and for those who own most of 
their assets in intangibles. Discrimination against Ohio companies also 
arises from the inclusion in the “business done” factor of the net worth
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formula of receipts from intangible assets which are sitused to Ohio (and 
only for Ohio companies), regardless of where they may actually be used.
Fourth, the net worth tax is a source of double taxation. This arises first 
because the net worth tax falls on the same assets as are taxed by the prop­
erty tax. The issue of double taxation of property has become more acute 
with the repeal in 1993 of the credit against the franchise tax for property 
taxes paid. That credit, it has been argued, helped equalize property tax bur­
dens for companies located in different local jurisdictions across Ohio.37 A 
second issue of double taxation arises when both parent company and sub­
sidiaries located in Ohio have to pay the net worth tax. However, this form 
of double taxation is being partially addressed with the new credit for in­
vestment in qualified subsidiaries.
Fifth, the net worth tax makes taxpayer compliance much harder and 
costlier. Both tax bases under the franchise tax, net income and net worth, 
must be fully computed every year despite the fact that only one will be used. 
The computation of the net worth tax is especially cumbersome because it 
requires the situsing of every component in the balance sheet based on com­
plex rules which in some instances go back at least half a century.38
Sixth, the net worth tax distorts the method of financing and it encour­
ages thin capitalization. Corporations that add to their real assets by bor­
rowing from a bank or issuing debt will not experience an increase in their 
net worth tax base. However, those corporations that purchase the same real 
assets financing them with new equity issues will experience an increase in 
the tax base by the entire amount of the investment. Thus, the marginal ef­
fective rate of taxation on the same asset goes from zero, if financed with 
debt, to a positive rate of taxation if the asset is not exempt. The effective 
marginal rate of taxation on any asset also depends on other provisions in 
the law, ranging from tax credits to depreciation rules.39
Seventh, the net worth tax may discourage investment in Ohio if the com­
bination of the net income tax and net worth taxes imposes a tax burden on 
capital invested in Ohio that exceeds the average tax burden imposed on 
capital in all other states. A  common view of the incidence of the corporate 
income tax is that the average burden imposed by corporate taxes may be 
paid by all capital owners across the nation. However, taxing capital invest­
ment more heavily than the average state will drive or keep investment out 
of this higher tax state as long as the after tax rate of return to capital is 
higher in other states. Because of the lower capital investment in the state, 
the tax burden of higher corporate taxes in reality is shifted to other factors 
of production in the state that are less mobile, such as labor and land.*"
This tendency of the net worth tax to drive or keep out corporate invest­
ment in Ohio will be more pronounced in the more heavily capitalized sec­
tors, such as manufacturing. Manufacturing has been the backbone of 
Ohio’s economy, although it has suffered a considerable decline in recent
550 A B L U E P R I N T  F O R  TAX R E F O R M
times. The question is to what extent the net worth tax has been a significant 
contributing factor to this decline.
A p p o r t io n m e n t  F o r m u l a s
There are several important differences between the apportionment for­
mulas for net income and net worth. The first and most obvious one is that 
net income is apportioned according to three factors (payroll, property, and 
sales, with the latter double-weighted), while net worth is apportioned ac­
cording to two factors (property and sales). Less obvious but just as impor­
tant is the fact that the definitions of the property and sales factors differ 
significantly in the two formulas.
The property factor in the net worth formula includes all types of assets: 
tangibles and intangibles. In contrast, the property factor in the net income 
formula includes only real and tangible personal property, including lease­
hold improvements and the value of rented property. The inclusion of in­
tangibles in the net worth formula has created problems for situsing the 
property and has given corporations an incentive to establish their legal 
domiciles outside of Ohio.
The “business done” factor in the net worth formula is also a wider con­
cept than the receipts from sales used in the net income formula. The busi­
ness done factor includes not only sales of tangible property and revenue 
from services but also rents and royalties, dividends and interest, patent 
copyrights, and in some cases the sale of assets.41 Dividends, interest, royal­
ties, and other intangible income are treated as allocable income under the 
net income tax and, therefore, do not enter the net income apportionment 
formula.
The differences in the two formulas highlight some contradictions in the 
philosophy underlying the two components of Ohio’s franchise tax. Under 
the net income base, a larger part of the tax is shifted to taxpayers outside 
Ohio by the fact that the sales factor is double weighted. The exclusion of al­
locable income from the sales factor also has the same effect, since its in­
clusion would increase the numerator of the factor more than the 
denominator. The exclusion of intangible property in the property factor of 
the net income tax also favors Ohio companies, since most of the intangible 
property would be sitused in Ohio.
Under the net worth tax, the computation of the two factor formula shifts 
the tax burden more towards Ohio corporations. This is because income 
from intangible assets is included in the business factor and intangible assets 
are included in the property factor. As a consequence, Ohio companies ex­
perience an increase in both factors vis-a-vis non-Ohio companies, since 
most intangible property and income have an Ohio situs.
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As discussed above, Ohio statutes do not address the issue of what to do 
with the factors in the net income apportionment formula when part of the 
corporation’s business takes place in a state that has no corporate income 
tax. By not adjusting the formula to these circumstances corporations actu­
ally obtain a lower tax. Some states have adopted adjustments in the formula 
by following a “throwback” rule, which assigns to the factor numerator of 
the taxing state the activity carried out in the states without a corporation 
tax, or a “throw out” rule, which eliminates from both the numerator and 
the denominator of the factor the activities carried out in the noncorporate 
tax states.
R e p o r t in g : Sep a ra t e  E nt it y  V er su s  
Co m b in e d  I n c o m e  R e p o r t in g
Most economists would agree that combined income reporting is the only 
sensible way to go about apportioning income to a state for any corporation 
that is part of a unitary or related business operating in that state or several 
states.42
The present approach of giving the option to file with combined income 
reporting when some minimum requirements arc met almost certainly guar­
antees that the only groups of corporations filing combined reports are 
those that can reduce their tax liability by doing so. Other corporations that 
use intercorporate transactions within and out of the state for tax planning 
purposes are not expected, of course, to file combined income reports.
The Tax Commissioner can require combined income reporting for a 
group of interrelated corporations. In practice this has been a complex and 
litigious process. In addition, the statutes also limit the initiative of the 
Commissioner in this respect. For example, since 1992 interest payments be­
tween related members, or charges for the use of intangible property, can­
not be considered sufficient grounds for requiring combined income 
reporting.43
Thus, the important issue here is how much income tax is avoided in Ohio 
because the majority of the corporations file as separate entities. Separate 
entity reporting leaves open many potential loopholes for tax avoidance. 
These range from the most apparent and well-known, such as the use of out- 
of-state passive investment companies (better known as Delaware holding 
companies), to the more sophisticated (and harder to detect) transfer pric­
ing schemes.
Some of these problems have been addressed with recent legislation in 
Ohio. The reform of the franchise tax law in 1991 ( “Budget Bill Am. Sub. 
H. 298) had two main objectives. The first was to make Ohio corporations 
take over certain gains recognized by “non taxpayer” (for Ohio purposes) 
related entities. The second was to deny Ohio corporations deductions for
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interest and other intangible expenses (such as charges for the use of intan­
gible property, royalties, patents, copyright fees and licensing fees) paid to 
“related entities” which for the most part are passive investment companies 
(“Delaware holding companies l l ) .44
There are other significant forms of intra-unitary transactions that the 
1991 reform did not address. These include the use of affiliated non-Ohio 
companies to hold assets generating investment income, the overstatement 
of costs and understatement of revenues through transfer pricing, and 
changes in location to avoid the situsing of assets to Ohio. To be fair, there 
is no law that can be comprehensive enough to deal with all these issues. But 
being able to take care of all these issues is the fundamental advantage of 
combined income reporting.
M in im u m  Ta x
The minimum tax of $50 in Ohio may be too low. It has not been changed 
for many years despite inflation. In fact, the actual amount of $50 may now 
be under what it actually costs the Department of Taxation to process a tax 
return.
Ta x in g  I n t e r e s t  F r o m  F e d e r a l  a n d  O h io  Se c u r it ie s
At present Ohio exempts interest from both federal government and 
State of Ohio securities. This conforms with the practice of many other 
states. In order to tax federal interest income it would be necessary to tax 
Ohio interest income. There are some states that do this. The attraction of 
this option is that it would facilitate the coverage of financial institutions 
under the general franchise tax. Banks and other financial institutions earn 
a good portion of their income from holding federal government securities 
in their portfolios.
A l l o c a t io n  V e r s u s  A p p o r t io n m e n t  O f  In c o m e
Is there a good rationale for keeping the distinction between allocable 
and apportionable income? Should this distinction be reformed, or even 
abandoned? Actually there are at least twelve states that do not distinguish 
between allocable and apportionable income. These are known as “full ap­
portionment states.”45 Many other states, including Ohio, distinguish be­
tween allocable and apportionable income. Most often what is 
apportionable and what is allocable income depends on whether the income 
is defined as business or non-business income, respectively. Business income
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is generally defined as that earned during the regular course of busi- 
ness.46The presumption for the distinction lies in the fact that some income 
is not earned by the application of factors of production but simply by the 
corporate entity itself, and these should be sitused where the corporation is 
domiciled. For example, dividend income from shares of other companies is 
considered to be earned by the corporation in a way that is different from 
the income derived from production and sale of goods and services. Many 
of the distinctions, such as royalties and technical service fees as passive in­
come, have little economic justification. Ohio is among the few states that 
make no distinction between business and non-business income but instead 
allocate certain types of income.
As in other areas of corporate state taxation, the potential for double tax­
ation of certain types of income increases, because the same income may be 
considered apportionable in one state and allocable in a different state.
The clear incentive for “headquarters” states is to classify income as allo­
cable, because 100 percent of it is taxed in the state. The disadvantage is that 
a very aggressive position on allocable income may cause some corporations 
to choose a different state for domicile. States with relatively few or impor­
tant company headquarters may have revenue advantages with the “full ap­
portionment” approach.
Th e  U se  o f  C o r p o r a t e  L im it e d  Pa r t n er sh ips  
as a  W a y  t o  A v o id  t h e  F r a n c h is e  Ta x
Partnerships, and in particular corporate partnerships, have been used 
for some time as a vehicle for tax planning. Multistate corporations may take 
advantage of different regulations to structure transactions across states 
boundaries to minimize taxes. One fundamental issue that arises with cor­
porate partners that have no direct business activities in a state is whether or 
not the corporate partner has tax nexus in the state because of its interest in 
the partnership doing business in the state. Most states, including Ohio, con­
sider the corporate partner to have nexus in the 46 state.47 Fewer states treat 
the partner’s distributive share as income from an intangible asset, and they 
source the income to the situs of the asset, i.e., to the state where the cor­
porate partner has its domicile. The revenue implications of choosing be­
tween the two regimes will differ from state to state, depending on the 
number and importance of out-of-state corporate partners and state domi­
ciled corporations entering partnerships outside the state.
An increasing loophole has appeared in recent times, with non-Ohio cor­
porations taking a limited partnership interest, directly or indirectly through 
wholly owned non-Ohio subsidiaries in an Ohio partnership. As opposed to 
the case of a general partnership interest in which the non Ohio corporation 
or its subsidiaries are declared to have nexus in Ohio, limited partners are
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treated as individual stockholders and through multi layering of subsidiaries 
may avoid income taxes entirely.
Ohio has recently adopted legislation recognizing the new business form 
of “limited liability company. “ In practice, this business form is taxed as a 
partnership that has only limited partners. The important issue here is that 
this new development could be used for tax avoidance schemes similar to 
those now being used with limited partnerships.
There are no easy solutions to the problem created by the use of limited 
partnerships by out-of-state corporations to escape the franchise tax in 
Ohio. Probably the simplest solution would be to change the law so that cor­
porate limited partners can be ruled to have nexus in Ohio and, therefore, 
be subject to the corporate franchise tax. However, this approach may face 
many legal hurdles. A  second solution, currently being studied by the 
Department of Taxation, is to use a withholding system in which the flow­
through entity is treated as a taxable entity, and the upstream corporations 
are credited for taxes already paid. A  third solution is for the state of Ohio 
to adopt mandatory combined income reporting. Relying on discretionary 
rulings by the Tax Commissioner to require combined income reporting 
would be very likely too time consuming and, given the past history of simi­
lar rulings, ineffective.
M u n ic ip a l  I n c o m e  Ta x e s
About 500 local jurisdictions in Ohio levy individual and business income 
taxes. These taxes represent a significant source of revenue for local gov­
ernments. One important issue is that this system of local taxation imposes 
heavy compliance costs on businesses because almost every jurisdiction has 
a different tax, with variations in the tax base, filing dates, and other admin­
istrative procedures. In the extreme case, an Ohio company would have to 
file close to 500 different taxes with complex administrative and appeal pro­
cedures.48
M e m b e rs h ip  in  UDITPA
There would be several benefits derived from joining the Multistatc Tax 
Compact (MTC) and subscribing to the Uniform Division of Income for Tax 
Purposes Act. Many other states do follow UDITPA, although often with 
some modifications. A  selected sample of states that do follow UDITPA is 
shown in Table 10-11. Among the most important benefits of joining the 
MTC are easy tax coordination with many other states that have joined the 
Tax Compact, use of the multistate audits of some corporations undertaken 
by the Tax Compact, and access to the interpretative rulings for difficult-to-
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tax economic sectors. On the other hand, Ohio has in its own way adopted 
many of the rules in UDITPA, and joining would not be cost free. The move 
might be regarded as anti-business, and the state would have to change 
important aspects of the franchise tax to adapt to UDITPA.
REFO RM  OPTIONS A N D  IMPLICATIONS 
R e f o r m in g  t h e  N e t  W o r t h  Ta x
One major reform option is to repeal the net worth component of the fran­
chise tax. The new corporate franchise tax would be based exclusively on the 
present corporate profit or net income.
The overall impact of this change is shown in columns 2 and 3 of Table 
10-22. The overall franchise tax liabilities for 1993 would have decreased 
from $630 million to $434 million, approximately a 31 percent decline. The 
elimination of the net worth tax would not affect those corporations that 
were already paying the net income tax, because this was the higher of either 
the net worth tax or the net income tax. The corporations that would bene­
fit from the reform are those corporations that were paying the net worth 
tax. However, some of these corporations that had positive net income 
would now pay the net income tax. This “residual” net income tax would 
have amounted to approximately $32 million, and this is included in the total 
net income tax in column 3 of Table 10-22 of $434 million. The simple repeal 
of the net worth tax basis produces winners by all asset sizes and in all eco­
nomic sectors, although winners are concentrated among the largest com­
panies by net worth size.
The repeal of the net worth tax may be accompanied by several additional 
reforms. A  central consideration of the complementary reforms is whether 
the entire package is to be made revenue-neutral. That is, do the new taxes 
make up for the losses in revenues represented by the elimination of the net 
worth tax? Or should no attempt be made to fully recover the lost revenues 
with the corporate franchise tax, leaving this task perhaps to other elements 
of the tax structure?
Revenue-neutral reform options. There are, of course, many possibilities 
that can be devised within the corporate income tax to make up for the rev­
enue losses caused by the repeal of the net worth component. They range 
from the introduction of a new separate tax on assets to changes in the base 
and rate of the net income tax. Combinations of several or all of these op­
tions could also be used instead of one simple option.
Here we consider three basic options: (i) the introduction of a new net 
worth tax that differs from the old tax in base, rate, and apportionment for­
mula; (ii) the introduction of a new asset tax, and (iii) an increase in the rate 
of the net income tax. Changes in the structure of the present net income
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TABLE 10-22
Reforming the Franchise Tax: Eliminating Old Net Worth Tax, 
Revenue Neutral Option 1
Net Worth Tax Using Reduced Base and Income Tax Combined
Revised Tax Rate ■ 0.13g%
Net Worth
Base
Corporate Tax Income Tax
Reduced Base Net 
Worth Tax
Calculated 
Corporate Tax Winners Losers Evtn
Less than I S33.862.764 S32.484.779 SI.586.750 $34.071.529 0% 2% 98%
Over 1 • 200.000 32.249.202 22.648.858 78.480 22.727.338 12% 4% 84%
200.001 • 500.000 25.889.826 17.056.832 114.562 17.171.395 71% 26% 3%
500.001 • 2.300.000 62.081.815 41.957.122 991,836 42.948.958 37% 61% 2%
2.500.001 - 5,000.000 27.672.764 20.612.339 1,667,925 22.280.264 24% 76% 0%
5.000.001 - 20,000.000 69.590.881 51.720.568 5,902,115 57.622.683 .20% 80% 0%
20.000.001 - 100.000.000 104.136.346 71.945.004 35,356,683 107.301.687 63% 36% 1%
100.000.001 • 250.000.000 62.431.082 43.731.704 26,183.638 69.915.342 31% 44% 25%
250.000.001 - 500.000.000 50.38.1815 32.558.519 29.098.608 61.657,127 40% 60% 0%
500.000. 001 - 750.000.000 27.084.813 15.493.821 34.332.427 49.826.248 18% 80% 2%
750.000.001 • 1.000.000.000 11.590.126 6.955.357 39,439.230 46.394.587 43% 57% 0%
Over 1 Billion 121.069.256 76.910.625 21.507.447 98.418.072 42% 58% 0%
Grand Tout S63Q.Q4Q.69Q 17% 19% 0.65
Base Reduced Base Net Calculated
Economic Sectors Corporate Tax Income Tax Worth Tax Corporate Tax Winners Losers Even
Agriculture. Forestry, and $2.886.417 S I.822.435 $49.663 $1.872.098 0% 100% 0%
Fishing
Mining 12.495.690 4,519,910 2.081.746 6.601.656 73% 19% 7%
Construction 22.223.744 16.288.119 1.731.008 18.019.127 52% 42% 5%
Manufacturing 288.514.301 215,100.251 84.620.539 299.720.790 42% 48% 10%
Transponat ion 50.709.262 30.443,411 5.230.586 35.673.997 66% 24% 11%
Wholesale Trade 50.174.092 36.713.264 13,474,041 50.187.305 30% 32% 38%
Retail Trade 67.201.264 52.503,273 6.217,814 58.721.087 44% 49% 7%
Finance. Insurance, and Real 55.122.385 26.130.085 71,486.014 97.616.100 33% 61% 7%
Estate
Services 60.897.735 40,282.818 8.252.912 48.535.730 18% 14% 69%
Unclassified 19.815.780 10.271.961 3,115,379 13.387.340 0% 3% 97%
Grand Tool S630.040.689 S434.075.528 $196.259.702 $630.335.230 17% 19% 65%
tax, such as changes in credits or adjustments to taxable income, would not 
by themselves make up for the revenue gap produced by the repeal of the 
net worth tax. More importantly, changes in the structure of the net income 
tax should be considered in terms of their impact on horizontal equity, eco­
nomic development, and other objectives rather than in terms of their im­
pact on revenue.
(i) New net worth tax. The new net worth tax would be paid by all corpo­
rations, including those paying the net income tax. It would be structured in 
a way that eliminates the main problems now existing with the net worth 
basis of the franchise tax. The tax base would comprise the corporation’s eq­
uity account (capital stock net of treasury stock, additional paid-in capital, 
and retained earnings) and the apportionment ratio would be the three-fac­
tor double-weighted sales formula currently used for the net income tax.
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The most important change in the tax base of this new net worth tax vis- 
a-vis the current net worth tax would be the elimination of reserves and de­
ferred taxes. These changes could be justified to the extent that both 
deferred taxes and reserves are set to offset future liabilities, and in that 
sense they should not be considered as part of the corporation’s net worth. 
However, this is a debatable point.
In particular, some reserves are set against future contingent liabilities 
which may never materialize. The level of reserves a corporation sets aside 
differs by type of business and other characteristics including management 
style. Even though most businesses have limits on how much they can put 
into reserves and for how long they will be able to hold idle reserves, it is 
clear that their exclusion from the net worth tax base is an opportunity for 
tax avoidance and a source of uneven tax treatment among otherwise simi­
lar firms. The data in Table 10-23 show the ratio of reserves and deferred 
taxes to total net worth by size of firm (measured by net worth) and by eco­
nomic sector, based on sample data from 1,377 corporation returns for 1993. 
These sample data show wide variations in the ratio, ranging from close to 
zero to 10 percent. On the other hand, the inclusion of reserves can lead to 
the unequal treatment of corporations with equal “long term” net worth.
The inclusion or exclusion of reserves in the tax base will simply translate 
into a lower or higher tax rate that will need to be applied to attain the rev­
enue target. We used a sample of tax returns to simulate the new net worth 
as if it had been in effect in 1993.49 These simulations are presented in the 
fourth column of Table 10-22. Besides the reduced base for the new net 
worth tax and the same apportionment formula as for the net income tax, we 
assume a tax rate of 0.138 percent for the new tax. This rate is dictated by 
the condition of revenue neutrality for the entire reform option: elimination 
of the current net worth tax, universal application of the net income tax, and 
introduction of the new net worth tax with overall revenue neutrality. Table 
10-22 is constructed to include the overall or combined tax burden of a uni­
versal net income tax and the new net worth tax by asset size and economic 
sector in the fifth column.
The rate structure of the new net worth tax could be chosen to have dif­
ferent profiles, including other flat rates which will not allow revenue neu­
trality for the entire package. With revenue neutrality, as simulated in Table 
10-22, 19 percent of the corporations would be losers, i.e., would pay a 
higher combined net income and new net worth tax. The clear net losers are 
those corporations now paying net income tax which would also have to pay 
the new net worth tax. Some corporations now paying the net worth tax may 
also be losers if they have enough positive net income. The simulations show 
that 17 percent of the corporations would be winners: they would be paying 
a lower combined tax than under the present franchise tax. The winners 
would be corporations with low or negative net incomes that are now paying
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TABLE 10-23
Ratio of Deferred Taxes and Reserves to Total Net Worth, 
by Economic Sector and Net Worth Size
Economic Sectors
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing 0.0129
Mining 0.0755
Construction 0.0166
Manufacturing 0.0491
Transportation 0.0981
Wholesale Trade 0.0281
Retail Trade 0.083
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate 0.0907
Services 0.0122
Unclassified 0.0251
Net Worth ($)
1 0.0268
200,000 0.0002
500,000 0.1073
2,500,000 0.0255
5,000,000 0.022
20,000,000 0.0397
100,000,000 0.077
250,000,000 0.0477
500,000,000 0.0802
750,000,000 0.0832
1,000,000,000 0.0446
Over 1 billion 0.0825
Source: Based on sample data from 1,377 franchise tax returns.
the net worth tax at a 0.582 percent rate rather than the 0.138 percent rate 
used in the simulations for the new net worth tax.
Although the majority of corporations, 65 percent, would not be affected 
by the changes in the net worth tax, the vast majority of these companies are 
those with net worth between $0 and $200,000.
The winners and losers by size of net worth and by economic sector, as 
shown in the last three columns of Table 10-22, are quite evenly distributed. 
Average-size firms in terms of net worth and those in the mining and trans­
port sectors are the more likely winners.
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This revenue-neutral simulation allows us to focus on the other important 
goals of reform. Despite the fact that they produce equal revenues, the uni­
versal net income tax combined with a new net worth tax would be generally 
preferable to the present net worth tax because it would be more horizon­
tally equitable and produce less economic distortion, such as penalization of 
new enterprises and penalization of corporations domiciled in Ohio. 
However, the new net worth tax still would discriminate among companies 
depending on how much of their assets were financed with debt and how 
much were financed with equity. The next set of revenue-neutral simulations 
would address this issue.
(ii) New total assets tax. An alternative to the new net worth tax is a tax on 
total (nonexempt) assets. The advantage of the assets tax, vis-a-vis a net 
worth tax, is that the formula does not discriminate among types of financ­
ing; and, therefore, it does not induce thin capitalization. The simulations in 
Table 10-24 are based again on the premise that the new total assets tax will
TABLE 10-24
Reforming the Franchise Tax: Eliminating Old Net Worth Tax, 
Revenue Neutral Option 2
Crow Assets Tax and Income Tax Combined 
Sft Assets Tax Rate - 0.0562%______________
Net Worth
Base 
Corporate Tax Income Tax
Total 
A wet Tax
Calculated 
Corporate Tax Winners Loser* Even
l « j  thaa 1 $35,862,764 $32,484,779 $2,985,589 $35.470.368 0 0.04 096
Over I - 200.000 35.862.764 22.648.858 107.702 22.756.560 0.14 0.06 0.8
200.001 • 500,000 25.889.826 17.056.832 250.079 17.306.912 0.62 0.18 0.2
500.001 - 2,500.000 62.081.815 41.957.122 818,900 42.776.021 0.42 0.39 0 19
2.500.001 - 5.000.000 27.672.764 20.612.339 1.206.501 21.818.840 024 0 59 0.18
5.000.001 • 20,000.000 69.590.881 51.720.568 4.434.451 56.155.019 0.2 0.72 0.08
- »0.001 - 100.000.000 104.136.346 71.945.004 63.873.004 135.818.009 0.59 0.4 0.01
* .000.001 -250.000.000 62.431.082 43.731.704 24.813.989 68.545.693 0.38 0 38 0.25
250.000,001 - 500.000.000 50.381.815 32.558.519 26.021.706 58.580.225 04 06 0
• XX). 001 .750.000.000 27.084.813 15.493.821 26,294.948 41.788.769 0.53 0.46
0.02
'000.001 - 1.000.000.000 11.590.126 6.955.357 28.661.292 35.616.649 0.43
0.57 0
Over 1 Billion 121.069,256 76.910.625 17.288.963 94.199.588 0.56
0.44 0
Grind Tool $630.040.690 S434.075.528 SI96.757.125 S630.832.653 0 18 0 IS
0.65
Economic Sector*
Base 
Corporate Tax Income Tax
Total 
A «et Tax
Calculated 
Corporate Tax Winners losers F.ren
Agriculture. Forestry and $2,886,417 $1,822,435 $45.102 $1.867.537 0
06 0.4
Fishing
0.12Mining 12.495.690 4.519.910 2.548.231 7.068.141 0.57 0.31
Construction 22.223.744 16.288,119 1.238.843 17.526.962 0.52
028 0.2
Manufacturing 288.514.301 215.100.251 67.156.507 282.256.758 0.45
0.44 0.11
Transportation 50.709.262 3.044.341 4,528.256 34.971.668 0.66
0.27 0.07
Wholesale Trade 50.174.092 36.713.264 18.838.865 55.552.129
0.32 0.46 0.21
Retail Trade 67.201.264 52.503.273 6.744.377 59.247.650 0.44
0.37 0.19
! 1 fiance. Insurance, and Real 55.122.385 26.130.085 83.525.498 109.655.583 0.33
0.57 0.11
Estate
Services 60.897.755 40.282.818 9.987.571 50.270.389
0.17 0.13 069
Unclassified 19.815.780 10.271.961 2.143.876
12.415.837 0.01 0.02 0.97
^  Total__________________ i lS 6 J 5 L U l
0 18 0 18 _ 0 65
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have to generate enough revenue to cover the revenue gap produced by the 
elimination of the present net worth tax. Revenue neutrality would have re­
quired a tax rate on total assets of 0.056 percent in 1993. The simulations in 
Table 10-24 are performed using the apportionment ratio from the net in­
come tax.
The distribution by size of net worth and economic sector of the total as­
sets tax is presented in the fourth column of Table 10-24. The combined bur­
den of the universal net income tax and the new total assets tax is presented 
in the fifth column. Overall, the distribution of the combined burden by size 
of net worth and economic sector is quite similar to that in the previous sim­
ulation with the “new net worth tax.” The percentages of corporations that 
are winners and losers are almost identical in the aggregate. However, there 
are more significant differences by net worth size and economic sector of the 
corporations. These differences between the two sets of simulations high­
light the relative arbitrariness of either tax base, as the ratio of net worth to 
total assets is likely to differ from corporation to corporation for multiple 
reasons.
Either tax, the new net worth or the total assets tax, still presents the 
problems of all asset taxes discussed in Section 3 of this chapter. They im­
pose a significant burden on enterprises when they may be least able to af­
ford it, and in particular they penalize new enterprises which tend to go 
through several years of losses. Either of these taxes may be more accept­
able or justifiable at lower levels as a way to charge corporations for the use 
of public services at the state level.50 This possibility is further discussed 
below.
(iii) Raising the rate o f the net income tax. An alternative way to cover the 
revenue gap produced by the elimination of the net worth tax is to raise the 
rate of the net income tax. This simulation is presented in Table 10-25. 
Based on 1993 tax returns, revenue neutrality would have required an in­
crease in the rate of 3.86 percentage points for net incomes above $50,000. 
The new tax rate for net incomes over $50,000 would have been 12.76 per­
cent, by comparison to the current rate of 8.9 percent. This would have 
made Ohio the state with the highest corporate income tax rate. At present, 
the highest rate is Pennsylvania’s 12.25 percent. The simulations assume that 
the current rate of 5.1 percent for net incomes below $50,000 stays the same. 
The intended effect in the distribution of tax burdens is a more skewed dis­
tribution, since now only those companies with positive net incomes would 
pay tax. However, companies that now are paying the net worth tax will not 
necessarily be large winners from this change. There are quite a few corpo­
rations paying the net worth tax at the present time that do have positive net 
incomes, and these companies would have to pay the new net income tax at 
a considerably higher rate.
Non-revenue-neutral reform options. As we have seen in the second sec­
tion, some states have along with the corporate net income tax a c o r p o r a te
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TABLE 10-25
Reforming the Franchise Tax: Eliminating Old Net Worth Tax, 
Revenue Neutral Option 3
Lr*v Additional Income tax on Net Income over S50.000 
V » T u  Rale - 3.M% _________________ ________
V i Worth ($)
Base 
Corporate Tax Income Tax.
Additional 
Income Tax
Calculated
Corporate
Tax Winners l-osen E*en
Leu thin I $35,862,764 $32,484,779 $12,653,125 $45,137,904 0% 1% 99%
Over 1 200.000 32.249.202 22,648.858 1,080.760 23.729.619 14% 1% 86%
200.001 - 500.000 25,889.826 17.056.832 993.127 18.049.960 71% 13% 16%
5a 001 - 2.500.000 62.081.815 41.957.122 11.892.096 53.849.217 42% 58% 1%
: 500.001 • 5.000.000 27.672.764 20.612.339 11,041,390 31.653.729 24% 76% 0%
$.000,001 • 20.000.000 69,590,881 51.720,568 24.143.682 75.864.250 24% 76% 0%
:o ooo.ooi - ioo.ooo.ooo 104.136,346 71,945.004 39,450.860 111.395.864 74% 25% 1%
100.000.001 - 250.000.000 62.431.082 43.731.704 22.449.196 66.180.900 44% 31% 25%
250,000.001 - 500.000.000 50,381.815 32.558.519 18.573.129 51.131.647 45% 16% 38%
ST .000,001 - 750.000.000 27.084.813 15.493.821 13.282,754 28.776.575 19% 80% 2%
'50.000.001 - 1.000.000.000 11.590.126 6.955.357 4,460,811 11.416.168 56% 44% 0%
0>*r 1 Billion 121.069.256 76.910.625 35.909.783 112.820.407 43% 57% 0%
Grand Tool $630 040.690 2 519^30.712 20% 13% 67%
Calculated
Base Additional Corporate
Economic Sectors Corporate Tax Income Tax Income Tax Tax w i m n Even
Agriculture, Forestry, and $2,886,417 $1,822,435 $532,426 $2,354,861 0% 60% 40%
Fishing
Mining 12.495.690 4.519.910 2.079.680 6.599.590 73% 20% 7%
Co— niction 22.223.744 16.288.119 7.215,950 23.504.070 52% 36% 11%
Manufacturing 288.514.301 215.100,251 111.162.795 326.263.046 51% 40% 9%
Transportation 50.709.262 30.443.411 9.651.634 40.095.046 66% 25% 9%
Wholesale Trade 50.174.092 36.713.264 13.743.347 50.456.611 40% 22% 38%
Retail Trade 67.201.264 52.503.273 21.148.548 73.651.821 44% 51% 5%
France. Insurance, and Real 55.122.385 26,130.085 10.205.405 36.335.490 43% 23% 34%
Estate
Services 60.897.755 40.282.818 16.672.171 56.954.990 20% 12% 69%
I'nclassified 19.815.780 10.271.961 3.518.754 13.790.715 1% 1% 99%
Grand Total j w . r a j a HM.0M.Hfl 20%
13% 67%
franchise tax based on net worth or assets, which is capped at some maxi­
mum payment. In addition, these taxes may have a flat rate or a graduated 
rate. This form of taxation has been conventionally justified as a minimum 
payment for the privilege of doing business in the state or as a minimum 
contribution for the use of services provided by the state, regardless of the 
profitability of the corporation. The final form such a tax may take is varied. 
One such schedule, which has been suggested by the business community, is 
presented in Table 10-26.51 It presents a graduated system of tax payments 
starting at $250 for those corporations with net worth (net capital stock plus 
additional paid-in capital plus retained earnings) below $10,000; it adds 
$500 more in payment for net worth between $10,000 and $50,000, and so 
on; and it is capped with a payment of $25,000 for net worth of over $1(X) 
million.52 Note that this option would change the minimum tax payment of 
the franchise, currently at $50 to $250.
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One important implication of using this form of declining schedule as op­
posed to a flat tax rate, for example, is that it tends to be regressive. This is 
clear from inspection of Table 10-26. At the mean value of the first bracket 
the marginal and average rates represented by the payment for the bracket 
are 5 percent. The corresponding payment for the next-to-last bracket rep­
resents a marginal rate of 0.04 percent and an average rate of 0.14 percent, 
both evaluated at the mean value of the bracket.
Table 10-27 shows the results of a simulation using the schedule shown in 
Table 10-26 and assumes the current net worth tax base, apportionment for­
mula. The simulations show that revenue from this tax will decrease slightly 
from $630 million to $576 million. The losers will be concentrated in the 
lower net worth categories. In terms of industry classification, all industries 
have a high proportion of losses if this type of tax is imposed.
A  different option is simply to reduce the net worth tax base, by defining 
the base as made up of net capital stock, paid in capital, and retained earn­
ings. Several rate simulations were run on this base. First we set the net 
worth tax rate at 0.1 percent. This yielded a loss of tax revenue of approxi­
mately $54 million, approximately 6 percent of corporate tax revenue. With 
a net worth tax rate of 0.075 percent, revenue loss increased to $89 million, 
or for 14 percent of current tax revenues, with a rate of 0.05 percent, rev-
TABLE 10-26 
Tax “Rate” Schedule for the New Net Worth Tax 
Proposed by the Private Sector
Net Worth ($) Tax ($)
0-10,000 250
10,001- 50,000 500
50,001 - 100,000 1,000
100,001 - 250,000 2,500
250,001 - 500,000 5,000
500,001 - 750,000 7,500
750,001 - 1,000,000 10,000
1,000,001 - 10, 000,000 15,000
10,000,001 - 100,000,000 20,000
Over 100,000,000 25,000
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TABLE 10-27
Reforming the Franchise Tax: Replacing Net Worth Tax with 
Capped Net Worth Tax, Non-Revenue Neutral Option 4
Vt Worth
Base
Corporate Ta* . !»cowtTax
Reduced Base 
Net Worth Ta*
Calculated
CorporateTa* Winners Losers K*en
Less thin I $35.862.764 $32.484.779 $2.369,110 $34,853.889 0% 100% 0%
Over 1 • 200.000 32.249.202 22.648.858 1.984.243 24.633.101 0% 100% 0%
200.001 - 500.000 25.889.826 17.056.832 1.486,114 18.542.946 0% 100% 0%
500.001 - 2.500.000 62.081.815 41.957.122 8.750.593 50.707.715 0 « 100% 0%
2.500.001 - 5.000.000 27.672.764 20.612.339 6.484.011 27.096.350 24« 76% 0%
5.000.001 - 20.000.000 69.590.881 51.720.568 12.673.574 64.394.142 15% 85% 0%
; .000 001 - 100.000.000 104.136.346 71.945.004 48.808,100 120.753.104 25% 75% 0%
100.000.001 - 250.000.000 62.431.082 43.731,704 25.239.431 68.971,135 16% 84% 0%
250.000.001 - 500.000.000 50.381.815 32.558.519 13.551.377 48,109,895 40% 60% 0%
500.000.001 - 750.000.000 27.084.813 15.493.821 6.771.767 22.265,588 7% 93% 0%
T50,000.001 • 1.000.000,000 11.590.126 6.955.357 5.975.200 12.930.557 44% 56% 0%
O ct 1 Billion 121.069.256 76.910.625 6.161.162 83.071.787 30% 70% 0%
<3 rind Tool $434.075.528 $142.254 682 S576.330.210 7% 93% 0%
Economic Sectors
Bate Corporate 
Tax Income Ta*
Reduced Bate 
Net Worth Ta*
Calculated 
Corporate Ta* Winner* Losers E»tn
Agriculture. Forestry and S2.886.417 $1.822.435 $102,685 $1,925,119 0% 100% 0%
Fishing
Mirung 12.495.690 4.519.910 2.205.200 6.725.109 24% 76% 0%
1 MNftti 22.223.744 16.288.119 3.138,173 21.426.293 8% 92% 0%
Manufacturing 288.514.301 215.100.251 68.865,033 283.965.284 23% 77% 0%
Transportation 50.709.262 30.443.411 6.383.597 36.827.008 7% 93% 0%
Wholesale Trade 50.174.092 36.713.264 13.783.118 50.496.382 13% 87% 0%
Retail Trade 67.201.264 52.503.273 7.704.923 60,208,196 11% 89% 0%
Finance. Insurance, and Real 55.122.385 26.130,085 17.188,001 43,318,086 20% 80% 0%
Estate
Services 60.897.755 40.282.818 16.547.712 56,830.531 3% 97% 0%
Unclassified 19.815.780 10.271.961 4.336.240 14.608.201 0% 100% 0%
Grand Total S630.Q40.689 S434.075.528 S142.254.682 S576.330.209 7% 93% 0%
enue losses increased to approximately $124 million, or about 20 percent of 
current tax revenues, and with a rate of a 0.01 percent, revenue losses 
amounted to $182 million, or approximately 28 percent of current revenues. 
In all these simulations the majority of taxpayers were not affected, and the 
number of winners and losers were of similar magnitude. Losers were con­
centrated in mining, construction, manufacturing and transportation, while 
winners were concentrated in wholesale and retail trade.
Ot h er  R e f o r m  O pt io n s
Coverage. The corporate franchise tax at present gives special treatment 
to corporations that are financial depositary institutions and exempts cor­
porations in other sectors, most importantly public utilities, telecommunica­
tions companies, and insurance companies, which are subject to special
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taxation regimes. Although at some point there may have been justification 
for the special tax regimes, such as the existence of monopoly power, or dif­
ficulties in administering and enforcing a franchise tax in these sectors, most 
of these reasons have now largely or completely disappeared. An important 
option for reform of the franchise tax is to make its coverage universal to all 
business corporations. There should not be any major difficulty in doing this, 
as long as those corporations thrown back into the general regime are sub­
ject to the federal corporate income tax. This universal coverage option 
under the corporate franchise tax does not preclude special taxation 
regimes, of course, because of the difficulty in applying sales taxes to finan­
cial institutions and insurance companies, and the desirability of excise tax­
ation of some utility services.
Apportionment formulas. Several options for reform should be considered 
in the apportionment formulas of the franchise tax. First we examine the op­
tions with respect to the apportionment formula for the net income tax. 
Next, we discuss options for the apportionment formula for the net worth 
tax, if this tax is to be kept in some form.
Heavier weight to sales in the net income formula? During the past decade, 
we have seen many states, including Ohio, that have used modified appor­
tionment formulas. The most common modification has been the switch to 
a double-weighted sales factor in the traditional three-factor formula. The 
latter is the apportionment formula used for the net income tax component 
in Ohio’s franchise tax. Several states have adopted formulas that give the 
sales factor an even larger weight, including the use of the sales ratio as the 
only factor in the formula.
The fundamental reason for adopting formulas giving more weight to the 
sales factor is to decrease the tax burden of companies with property and 
payroll in the state and increase it for out-of-state companies selling (but not 
producing) commodities within the state. The longer term goal of this pol­
icy is to encourage the location of businesses in the state.
The issue is whether the State of Ohio should consider a single-factor 
sales formula for the net income tax. The answer may be yes if the objective 
is to let Ohio become more competitive in attracting business locations vis- 
a-vis other states that already have adopted modified apportionment for­
mulas. This statement does not assume that changes in the apportionment 
formula and therefore in state franchise taxes are decisive in affecting busi­
ness location. However, this is an issue on which there is no convincing em­
pirical evidence one way or another.53 It should also be understood that the 
competitive margin granted by modifications in the formula would be erased 
as soon as other states introduced similar modifications in the apportion­
ment formula.
To explore the impact of switching to a single sales factor for the net in­
come tax in Ohio, we ran a simulation isolating this factor from any other 
changes. The results are presented in Table 10-28. The move would have
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TABLE 10-28
Simulation Results of Moving to a Single Sales Factor 
for the Net Income Tax
v i Worth 1$)
Base
___ £.o.r.Eora_te T»x
New 
Corporate Tax Winner* Losers Even
Less than 1 $35,862,764 $34,735,433 0.6% 0.4% 99 0%
Over 1 - 200.000 32,249,202 2,222,534 1.4% 0.0% 98 6%
100.001 - 500.000 25,889,826 2.118,991 20.2% 1.5% 78 3%
500.001 - 2.500.000 62,081,815 21.540,353 31.4% 8.0% 60 6%
:.500.001 - 5.000.000 27.672,764 19,932.529 66 1% 6 8% 27 1%
$.000,001 ■ 20.000.000 69,590,881 45,915,902 57.1% 13.1% 29 8%
; 000.001 • 100.000.000 104,136,346 129,760.020 9.3% 12.1% 78 5%
».000.001 - 250.000.000 62,431,082 73,473.463 60% 180% 75 9%
.'50.000.001 - 500.000.000 50,381,815 60.251,007 4.1% 12.4% 83 4%
500.000. 001 • 750.000.000 27,084.813 44.797,523 2.0% 42 8% 55 2%
750.000,001 • 1.000.000,000 11,590,126 23,341,017 00% 31.0% 69 0%
Over 1 Billion 121.069,256 150,329,233 3.7% 54 0% 42 3%
Grand Total 62% 5.1% 88 7%
Base New
honomtc Sectors ( nrp.r-.tr lax Corporate Tax Winners Losers Even
\griculture. Forestry, and Fishing $2,886,417 $1,440,781 400% 20.0% 400%
Mining 12.495.690 12.511.913 14.7% 6 2% 79.1%
Co-in ruction 22.223.744 20.509.373 188% 13.5% 67 7%
Manufacturing 288.514,301 335.171.073 18.6% 17.7% 63 8%
T'importation 50.709.262 34,939,703 13.1% 6.4% 80 5%
Wholesale Trade 50.174.092 45,808.991 11.1% 63% 82 6%
Rruil Trade 67,201,264 52,729,962 30.3% 118% 57 9%
r nance. Insurance, and Real Estate 55.122.385 40.172,667 10.4% 3.3% 86 3%
Services 60,897.755 53.749,529 3.9% 65% 89 6%
Inclassified 19.815,780 11,384,010 0.2% 0.1% 99 7%
GrandTottl MW.1 6.2% 5 1%
88 7%
produced a decrease in franchise revenues in 1993 of approximately $21.6 
million, or a 3.4 percent decrease in revenues. This change is small enough 
to be associated simply with the sampling error in the simulation. Notice, 
however, that these results represent static changes for that particular year. 
That is, the results do not include any potential gains in revenues that may 
be realized from additional corporations moving production activities to 
Ohio. The distribution of winners tends to favor middle sized firms (in net 
worth), which are more likely to have payroll and property used in produc­
tion in Ohio. The losers tend to be larger-size firms, which have relatively 
more sales than labor and property used in production in the state. Most of 
the small firms which tend to be 100 percent Ohio operations, with an ap­
portionment ratio of 100, are not affected by the change. The distribution of 
winners and losers by economic sector is more even. Every sector has more 
winners than losers except for the service sector. On the whole, 88.7 percent 
of the companies are not affected, but that is mostly because of the much 
larger number of companies that are all Ohio companies.
Are there any significant arguments against the change in the apportion­
ment formula? One consideration is the fact that by adopting a single sales
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factor O hio would move state corporate taxation still further from a uniform 
apportionm ent system such as the one predicated in UDITPA.54 The lack of 
a uniform  system creates the possibility of over-apportionm ent of corpora­
tion incomes am ong those states with a corporate income tax.55 Those com­
panies m ore adversely affected by the possible change in the apportionment 
form ula, large corporations with extensive sales in Ohio and relatively small 
production facilities, will likely put up a strong campaign calling the move 
unfair.
A priori there is no overwhelming reason to  use one form ula over another 
in apportioning income. Justifications of any of the formulas can be made 
ex-post, each one b e tte r capturing the underlying causes of the tax base. In 
reality, the multiplicity of formulas and apportionm ent schemes used in 
o th e r states puts Ohio, as any o th e r state, in the position of having to care 
only about w hat form ula will maximize revenue over the long run. It is im­
portan t to em phasize again that the revenue perspective must be a long­
term  perspective, because the tax base in the state may increase or decrease 
as m ore com panies locate in o r  outside Ohio in response to the formula 
adopted. Revenues in the long run will also be affected by the apportion­
m ent form ulas adopted by o ther states. U nfortunately, there is no evidence 
on how im portant any of these effects may be on a state by state basis.
Reforming the apportionment formula for the net worth tax. If the net worth 
tax were to  be kept either in its current form o r as a new modified net worth 
tax excluding reserves and deferred taxes from the base, there are several 
possibilities for changing the apportionm ent form ula for either tax. The cur­
ren t two factor form ula could be substituted with the three-factor double­
w eighted form ula used in the net income tax. This would have the effect of 
shifting the burden of the net worth tax toward out of state companies. This 
would be so because of the double weighting of sales and because of the ex­
clusion of intangible income and assets from the com putation of the sales 
and property  factors, respectively. The a priori expectations of the impact of 
this change is that most winners would be concentrated among small and 
middle-sized com panies, which would tend to  be Ohio companies, and most 
losers would be concentrated am ong larger size companies, which would 
tend to include m ore non-Ohio companies.
A second possibility would be to  apportion the net worth base with a two- 
factor form ula based on sales and property, as com puted now for the net in­
com e tax. This change should still lighten the tax burden of Ohio companies 
com pared to  out-of-state com panies, but quite probably less than by using 
the double-w eighted sales three factor form ula of the net income tax. A 
third possibility would be to use a single-factor formula, with the choice 
being betw een the property factor and the sales factor.
Use o f  the throwback rule. O hio could join o ther states in introducing a 
throw back rule in the com putation of the sales factor in the apportionm ent 
form ula for net income taxes. O f course, this would help increase revenues
The General Franchise Tax 567
from the franchise tax, but in minor amounts. What the rule would do is ap­
portion corporate income to the State of Ohio that otherwise might not be 
apportioned anywhere else. However, given the many differences in appor­
tionment formulas across states under which multistate corporations have to 
file, the introduction of a throwback rule would tend to destroy the little 
cushion corporations may have to avoid the over-apportionment and, there­
fore, double taxation of their incomes.
Raise the minimum payment o f the franchise tax. Regardless of what is 
done in o ther areas o f the franchise tax, there is the option to increase the 
minimum paym ent under the franchise tax from its current $50 level. The 
current $50 may be too low to cover the expense to the Tax Department of 
processing a tax return. The increase in the minimum payment can be made 
part of a new net w orth tax, as we have seen above. Table 10-29 shows the 
potential impact on revenues of raising the minimum payment by $50 steps 
from the current level o f $50 to  $500. At the present level of $50 the mini­
mum tax raises $2.2 million, representing 0.36 percent of corporate fran­
chise tax revenues. With a minimum tax o f $500, revenues raised would have 
been $22.4 million, o r 3.56 percent o f corporate franchise tax revenues. 
These calculations are perform ed on the basis of the num ber of corpora­
tions that should have paid the minimum tax in 1993.
Tax rates. Ohio already has one of the highest corporate income tax rates, 
as discussed in Section 2. Still the possibility is there to increase tax rates. An 
increase of 1 percent in the top rate for net incomes above $50,000 would 
have generated betw een $40 million and $50 million in additional tax rev­
enues in 1993.
TABLE 10-29 
Effect on Tax Revenue of Increasing 
the M inimum Corporate Tax
Minimum Tax Amount
Amount of Revenue 
G enerated
Percent of Total Current Tax 
Revenue
550 S2.242.750 0.3560
S100 S4.485.500 0.7119
S150 S6.728.250 1.0679
5200 $8,971,000 1.4239
5250 $11,213,750 1.7798
5300 $13,456,500 2.1358
5350 $15,699,250 2.4918
5400 $17,942,000 2.8477
5450 $20,184,750 3.2037
5500 $22,427,500 3.5597
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O th er possibilities for reform in the rate structure include changing the 
net income threshold of $50,000 for the current lower rate of 5.1 percent, 
changing the lower rate itself, and introducing one or more additional brack­
ets. Several states, including Iowa, Kentucky, and Missouri, have graduated 
progressive rate  schedules. The advantage of the present system, with a 
lower rate for relatively small levels o f income, is tha t it does offer some ad­
vantage to small businesses w ithout sacrificing a large sum in revenues and 
w ithout giving strong incentives for the breakup of larger companies into 
sm aller units. This is a common criticism of progressive rate schedules for 
co rporate  income taxes. However, there is little empirical evidence on how 
im portant these effects may be in reality.
Credits and other tax benefits. T here  are, as we saw in Section 1, many tax 
credits and o ther tax benefits tha t underm ine the revenue-raising capacity of 
the franchise tax at the present time. Some of the credits appear to be justi­
fied, in o rder to avoid the double taxation of assets. But most of the credits 
have been introduced in the spirit o f the necessity of special treatm ent to en­
courage certain activities. There is no general consensus among economists 
about the desirability and effectiveness of these incentives; the experience of 
d ifferent tax systems with a variety of tax benefits is that many of these in­
terventions do not seem  to produce the desired objectives, and sometimes 
they may actually be harmful because of the misallocation of resources they 
induce.
T he reform  o f the corporate franchise tax is clearly an opportunity to re­
view and simplify the system of credits and tax incentives under the franchise 
tax. If the franchise tax is simplified with the elim ination of the net worth 
com ponent, there will be room  to further simplify the system of tax benefits 
and tax incentives.
Make all allocable income apportionable. As we have seen, Ohio allocates 
certain  types of income, mostly from  intangible assets, regardless of whether 
these incomes have a business o r non-business source. Some states also al­
locate to  the state non-business income. Yet som e other states make no dis­
tinction between business and non-business income and make all types of 
incom e apportionable, as opposed to allocable.
O ne option for reform  in O hio is to make all types of income apportion­
able. This possibility is simulated in Table 10-30. This change would have 
been a mild revenue winner in 1993, raising $23.5 million in additional tax 
revenues. Again in this case, all-Ohio com panies (small and middle- size) 
tend  to  be relative winners since all their incomes that before were 100 per­
cen t allocable are now apportionable at less than 100 percent, if the corpo­
ration has business outside Ohio. The relative losers tend to be larger 
non-O hio com panies which before could exclude allowable income not si- 
tused to  Ohio, but now would have to include all those incomes as appor­
tionable. The distribution of w inners and losers by economic sector shows
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Corporation Tax without Using Schedule C (Allocable Income) 
in Computing Taxable Income
TABLE 10-30
V t Worth ($)
Base 
Corporate Tax
New 
Corporate Tax Winner, Loser, Even
Less than 1 $35,862,764 $34,427,439 0 « 3 « 9 7 «
Om  1 200.000 32.249.202 2.504.658 5% 1« 9 4 «
:oo.ooi - 500.000 25.889.826 2.268.087 42« 19« 39«
500.001 - 2.500.000 62,081.815 22.980.754 49« 15« 35«
500.001 - 5.000.000 27.672.764 22.903.800 34« 5« 61«
SDO.OOO.OOl - 20.000.000 69.590,881 57.024.704 40« 16« 44«
:o ooo.ooi • loo.ooo.ooo 104,136,346 157.289.230 31« 53« 16«
100.000.001 • 250.000.000 62.431.082 78.633.555 26« 37« 3 7«
250.000,001 • 500.000.000 50.381.815 67.935.855 21« 76« 3 «
500,000,001 • 750.000.000 27.084.813 49.018.931 39« 56« 6 «
*50.000.001 • 1.000.000.000 11.590.126 24.047.070 17« 83« 0 «
Over 1 Billion 121.069.256 134.523.081 54« 44« 2 «
Grand Tottl xxmm 12« 15« 73 «
Economic Sector?
Base 
Corporate Tax
New 
Corporate Tax Winners leasers Even
At' culture. Forestry, and $2,886,417 $1,249,378 10« 0 « 90«
Fishing
Mining 12.495.690 12,029.018 29« 44« 27«
Construction 22.223,744 18.732,813 47« 20« 34«
Manufacturing 288.514.301 360.418.276 27« 44« 28«
Transportation 50.709.262 38.412,253 50« 14« 35«
Whc c  alc Trade 50,174.092 46.687.465 22« 23« 55«
Retail Trade 67.201.264 55.493.993 50« 19« 31«
Finance, Insurance, and Real 55.122.385 46.137.737 39« 43« 18«
Estate
Service* 60.897.755 62.216.255 8« 14« 78«
Unclassified 19.815.780 12.179.976 0 « 3 « 97«
Grand Tottl tt33.tt7.lM 12« 15« 73«
the same result. Those sectors that are more likely to have Ohio companies 
(e.g., construction and retail trade) tend to be winners.
Should Ohio require combined income reporting for unitary businesses? The 
advantages of m andating combined income reporting for unitary businesses 
are many. Fundam entally, combined income reporting eliminates artificial 
discrepancies in the tax base through accounting and arbitrary allocations of 
revenues and expenses across state boundaries.
However, com bined income reporting is still controversial as an appor­
tionment m ethod. Critics have argued that combined income reporting is 
contrary to the arm ’s-length standard and to the formulary apportionm ent 
of a single taxpayer’s income. The counter answer from proponents of com­
bined income reporting  is that the arm ’s-length standard and single taxpayer 
formulary apportionm ent have become fictions in a world where unitary 
businesses have at their disposal a variety of avenues to artificially reduce 
their state tax liabilities.
Combined income reporting is not a panacea, either. M andating it will re-
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quire a very clear set o f regulations in complex areas. Combined reporting 
should be distinguished from consolidated return filing. The following para­
graphs describe some of these distinctions, and briefly review the scope of 
issues that would have to be decided if m andatory combined income report­
ing w ere adopted.
C om bined reporting is an approach for determ ining the income attribut­
able to  a state from each of the corporations that are members of an affili­
ated  group of com panies conducting a unitary business in several states.56 
W hen there is m ore than one corporation in the affiliated group doing busi­
ness in the state, the unitary income apportioned to the state is in turn ap­
portioned  am ong the different com panies with nexus in the state.57 
D epending on the type of com bined reporting, not all affiliated corporations 
in a group may be combined. Com bination applies to  a “unitary business,” 
and the determ ination of what this is can vary.
It is im portant to distinguish between the filing of “combined income re­
ports” and the filing of “consolidated returns.” These two terms are at times 
used interchangeably, but they are quite different things. The objective of 
com bined income reporting is not to tax the income of the affiliated group 
as a whole o r  the filing o f a consolidated return. R ather, the objective is to 
determ ine the portion of the income from the unitary business attributable 
to the com panies with nexus or operations in the state. The combined in­
come report is an inform ation return  rather than a tax return. Each corpo­
ration in a com bined report with nexus in the state still has to file its own 
corporate  tax return. See Box 10-2 for the steps followed in combined in­
come reporting.
By contrast, in a consolidated return the total net income of the corpora­
tions in the group is filed in a single return and a single tax is paid (even 
though each of the corporations is jointly and severally liable for payment). 
In the case of consolidated returns, net income is not limited to that related 
to a specific unitary business. O f course, when the consolidated business op­
erates in m ore than one state, apportionm ent will be necessary in the con­
solidated return. See Box 10-2.
Two im portant decisions would have to be made if the State of Ohio were 
to require com bined income reporting for all unitary businesses. These con­
cern the “basis,” o r how far and wide the com bination should go, and the 
“standards,” or how to determ ine which corporations should file a combined 
report.58
T he choices for basis are essentially three, although some combinations 
of these three are also possible: worldwide com bination, which includes all 
dom estic and foreign income; domestic or w ater’s edge combination, which 
includes only U nited States source income; and a nexus combination which 
includes only com panies with nexus in the state, or corporations domiciled 
in the state, or some com bination thereof.
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BOX 10-2
State’s Apportionm ent in Combined Income Reports*
Under a com bined income approach the share of income of the 
unitary business that is taxable in the state is determined as fol­
lows:
First, define the scope of the unitary business and what corpora­
tions should be m ade part of the combined report.
Second, determ ine the net income derived by the unitary busi­
ness inside and outside the state, eliminating all income and 
expenses attributable to internal transactions within the unitary 
group itself.
Third, determ ine the share of the unitary group’s income that is 
allocable to  the state and then determ ine the part of the unitary 
business income that is apportioned to the state, and apply the 
statutory form ula for apportioning the unitary business income 
(not directly allocable).
Fourth, divide the total net taxable income of the unitary business 
attributable to the state among the corporations of the group that 
have nexus within the state according to the distribution among 
them of the factors used in the apportionm ent formula.
‘A dapted  from  John  L. Coalson, Jr. and  Michael T. Plrik, “C onsolidated or 
Com bined R etu rns an d  A lternative C orporate  Reporting M ethods: A G eorgia 
Perspective,” Journal o f  State Taxation, Vol. 8, No.2, Fall 1989, pp. 132-151.
The standards used to  determ ine when a group of affiliated companies 
actually constitutes a unitary business vary. The most common standard is 
based on the “three unities” of common ownership, common management, 
and common operation o r use. Common ownership is typically interpreted 
to exist when 50 percent or more of the stock of a corporation is owned by 
another corporation. Common management is typically interpreted to  exist 
when there are overlapping boards o f directors or common managers in key 
positions. Com m on operation is interpreted to exist when there are common 
functions of m anagem ent, financing, accounting, advertising, or purchasing.
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O th er standards used rely on the existence of dependency or contribu­
tions betw een affiliated corporations, similarities in the line of business, or 
significant in tercorporate transactions.
Net operating losses. The state could introduce a carry back provision for 
NOLS, to  be m ore competitive. However, the present provision of no cany 
back allowed does not put O hio at a disadvantage with neighboring states 
and avoids some of the revenue instability associated with the carry back 
provision.
Joining the Multistate Tax Compact? Joining the M ultistate Tax Compact 
and subscribing to UDITPA (The Uniform Division of Income for Tax 
Purposes Act) would require som e im portant changes in the Ohio corporate 
franchise tax, most im portantly in the apportionm ent formula. There would 
be the advantage of adding clarity and standardized procedures. The state 
tax adm inistration also would benefit from the m ultistate audits and inter­
pretive rulings done by the Tax Compact for specific business sectors. 
However, joining UDITPA may be unfavorably regarded in the business 
community.
The reform o f  local income taxes. There is am ple room for standardization 
and sim plification of these taxes. Ideally, at the very least, all local jurisdic­
tions would adopt the same basic tax structure and procedures, although 
they would be able to vary the rates. Some degree of discretion in the abil­
ity to raise revenues is desirable, to  increase efficiency and accountability in 
local governm ents.59 U nder this approach each business would still have to 
file a tax return  in each of the jurisdictions where it operates. An even more 
simplified approach would be to  rely on centralized filing with the State 
D epartm ent of Taxation and to devise a system for the apportionment of 
collections am ong local jurisdictions. This approach would significantly re­
duce com pliance costs for businesses, and in theory it could be structured to 
allow differentiated rates for local jurisdictions.
E l im in a t io n  o f  t h e  F r a n c h is e  T a x
The last option to consider is the com plete elimination of the corporate 
franchise tax. Four states (N evada, South D akota, Washington, and 
W yoming) have at present no corporate income tax.60 The substitution of 
co rpora te  income tax revenues with existing taxes, such as the personal in­
com e tax or the sales tax, is quite feasible. The corporate income t a x  yielded 
$630 million in 1993. This revenue could have been collected from the per­
sonal income tax by either o f two changes: 1) getting rid of the following 
credits and income exclusions: social security and railroad retirem ent exclu­
sions, personal exemption credits, senior citizen credits, joint filer credits, 
and retirem ent income credits (all m ajor credits and adjustments on the in­
dividual income tax); o r 2) by a 0.5 percent surcharge on taxable income (ef­
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fectively increasing all rates by 0.5  percent). T he elim ination o f  the corp o­
rate incom e tax w ould  create a m ore attractive business clim ate. State co r­
porate in com e taxes, including the corporate franchise tax in O hio, 
represent d ou b le  taxation  o f  corporate incom e because o f  their lack o f  in te ­
gration w ith the p erson al incom e tax. T his double taxation is im posed on top  
of the doub le taxation  o f  corporate incom e at the federal level w here there 
is no integration  o f  th e two taxes either. An additional attraction o f  co m ­
pletely elim inating  the corporate incom e tax is that the state w ould not have 
to continue to  rely on  an unstable and probably declining source o f  rev­
enues. T h e m ain d isadvantage o f  e lim inating the corporate franchise tax is 
that there w ould  b e  a shift o f  tax burdens now borne by nonresidents (as 
owners o f  capital and consum ers) to  state residents. A lthough a portion o f  
the franchise tax is surely exported , that may not be the case with substitute 
taxes such as the p erson a l incom e tax or the sales tax.
APPENDIX  
T A X  R E T U R N  S A M P L E  D A T A  U S E D  
IN  T H E  M IC R O -S IM U L A T IO N S
Sampling was performed on the basis o f a master file of taxpayers from the Ohio 
Department of Taxation. This file had information coded from the first page of the 
corporate return. In total there were approximately 107,000 taxpayers. Most o f the 
information needed to construct the tax calculator was not available from the tax re­
turn’s first page. This necessitated the drawing of a sample of fully filled-out tax re­
turns. The sample originally designed contained the complete set o f the largest 500 
companies in terms o f  tax liability. We added to them a random sample of just over
1 percent o f the remaining firms that accounted for an additional 1,000 firms. A 
small number o f firms with no taxable income but “large” net worth tax liability was 
also included to make sure that firms were represented.
After the coding o f entire data, some tax returns were not usable due to taxpayer 
errors and omissions. In addition, some tax returns were not available because they 
were in the audit process. The final sample contained 1377 firms representing 44.2 
percent of the total franchise tax revenues collected by the state. The results from 
this sample were “blown-up” to the entire set o f taxpayers. Because we used three 
different samples (a full sample of the largest companies, a full sample of zero or low 
profit but high net worth firms, and a random sample of the remaining firms), dif­
ferent “blown up” factors were used so that the revenue contribution for each sam­
ple matched the population from which it was drawn. The sample returns after being 
“blown-up” replicated 99 percent o f the actual revenue collected in 1993. The tax 
calculator built replicated the corporate income tax forms. The calculator was used 
to develop the base core analysis and was modified to develop the simulation results.
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2. “D oing business” in the state is evidenced by a number o f activities, such as listing 
the company in the phone book or the licensing o f software. Ohio takes one of the 
most aggressive stands in determining nexus. Some o f these are reviewed below in 
the comparison o f Ohio franchise tax with that in other states.
3. Since 1993 railroad companies no longer pay the public utility excise tax and are 
instead subject to the regular franchise tax.
4. Other corporations exempted from the franchise tax are nonprofit corporations 
(except for some consumer and agricultural cooperatives), municipal corporations, 
credit unions, real estate investment trusts, regulated investment companies, and 
real estate mortgage investment conduits (ORC 1733.43, 5733.01, 5733.09, and 
5733.10).
5. States are not allowed to tax interest from federal obligations if they exempt in­
terest income from state public obligations.
6. See the Department o f Taxation’s Annual Report 1992, page 21, for recent signif­
icant court decisions involving the issue o f allocable versus apportionable income.
7. Dividends are allocated to the state according to the “Ohio-to-be-everywhere" 
ratio for the book value o f assets o f the payor company. Dividends from Domestic 
International Sales Corporations and from corporations for which there is no infor­
mation on the location o f  assets are apportioned.
8. Trademark royalties are not considered patent or copyright royalties, and they are 
treated as apportionable income.
9. Prior to 1982 the carry forward period was five consecutive years.
10. The gross profit portion of income received but not yet earned is includable in 
the value o f the stock, as are net deferred tax liabilities. Contingent liabilities are in­
cluded in the computation of net worth if the corporation cannot reasonably esti­
mate the amount o f the liability or if it cannot be established that the liability is to be 
incurred in the current period.
11. Intangible assets are not part o f goodwill if they can be sold and purchased sep­
arately with an identifiable value.
12. This tax offers a mild incentive for filing a combined franchise report. The entire 
group o f  corporations pay only the two tier litter tax once as a group rather than in­
dividually by each corporation.
13. For a more detailed analysis o f the effects o f credits, or economic d e v e lo p m e n t 
in Ohio, see Michael Wasylenko, “The Role o f  Fiscal Incentives in Economic 
Development: How Ohio Stands Relative to its Competitor States,” Chapter 9 in this 
volume.
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14 The Amended Substitute Bill 32 extended the credit for qualifying new invest­
ments with respect to property acquired before 1989. This Bill also created a re­
fundable credit, while the original new investment credit is a non-refundablc credit.
15. The conditions are regulated in Ohio Revised Code Section 5733.052 and Tkx 
Commissioner’s Rule 5703-5-06.
16. Each o f the corporations combining incomes must have income other than divi­
dend income within Ohio.
17. Corporations without business nexus in Ohio may be included in a combined in­
come report with approval o f the Commissioner. However, these corporations must 
derive income in the same fashion as the taxpayer corporations.
18. In a recent case the O hio Board of Tax Appeals held that corporations filing com­
bined franchise tax reports for prior years may not add retroactively another corpo­
ration to the com bined group without consent o f the Commissioner. The 
Commissioner had withheld consent, arguing that the subsidiary which was trying to 
add to the combined group had no income allocable or apportionable to the state of 
Ohio (The Tranzonic Companies and Subsidiaries w. Tracy, Ohio Board of Tax 
Appeals, December 4 ,1992).
19. ACIR (1993).
20. The representative tax system is defined by the ACIR at the average state cor­
porate income tax rate times the national corporate profits apportioned to the state 
according to a three factor (sales, property and employment) formula.
21. Note that Figure 1-9 uses two scales, in millions for Ohio and in billions for all 
states.
22. However, S corporations do face a number of restrictions which do not affect C 
corporations. S corporations cannot have more than 35 shareholders, they can issue 
only one type o f stock, they must be domestic corporations, and they may not be part 
of an affiliated group.
23. See Robert Carrol and David Joulfaian (1993).
24. See Alan J. Auerbach and James Poterba (1993).
25. From an average o f 10.9 percent in the 1960s the profit rate fell to 7.2 percent 
during the 1970s and 4.9 percent during the first half of the 1980s.
26. The Supreme Court has ruled that the taking of sales orders by a traveling sales­
man does not constitute nexus when those orders are filled and delivery is made from 
a location outside of the state. However, a permanent employee in the state for sales 
activities may be outside the spirit o f the Supreme Court ruling.
27. For the rationale behind different formulas, see Peggy B. Musgrave (1994b).
28. Approval o f the Tax Commissioner is required.
29. These deductions are related to the domestic corporation dividends subject to 
the 70 percent deduction.
30. Of course, the federal government imposes an alternative minimum tax but this 
falls on income (at 20 percent on the regular net income base grossed up for tax pref­
erences) rather than assets.
31. Besides Pennsylvania, other states with significant net worth taxes are Alabama, 
Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas.
32. See A. Estache (1990).
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33. See Peter D. Byrne (1994).
34. Business taxes on assets are actually used as a method o f presumptive income tax­
ation based on the idea that capital assets will produce some minimum rate of return 
on average or otherwise the enterprise would get out o f the business.
35. Allowing the asset tax to be carried forward as a credit still does not solve the 
major problem discussed below that the tax imposes a burden when the firm can 
least afford it. Actually, the credit provides relief when the firm is in a better posi­
tion and may not need the relief as much.
36. Som e countries with taxes on gross or net assets have addressed this problem by 
exempting newly formed companies for several years. Ohio does not have a similar 
provision regarding the net worth tax.
37. The credit, it is argued, also may have served as a check on property tax  increases 
at the local level, since increases in property taxes meant decreases in s ta te  taxes. 
However, it may have worked the other way around. With the credit in place local ju­
risdictions may have had an incentive to increase property taxes, since the credit it 
was the state and not the companies that actually had to pay the tax (for as long, of 
course, as the companies were paying the net worth tax component of the franchise 
tax rather than the net income component).
38. The situsing rules are for the most part those in the statutes o f the intangible 
property tax, which was repealed in 1986. In terms of complexity, business represen­
tatives often referred to the instructions for situsing, investment in subsidiaries, 
which is 25 pages long.
39. The marginal effective rates o f taxation are calculated by assuming identical pre­
tax rates o f  return for different assets and economic sectors and calculating an after­
tax rules o f  return for each type of investment after all aspects o f taxation affecting 
those investments are taken into consideration.
40. See Charles E. McLure, Jr. (1986). Peter Mieszkowski and John Morgan (1984).
41. The only receipts excluded from the business done factor are management fees 
for services by a parent company for a subsidiary without a profit element, and the 
proceeds from the sale o f  som e assets.
42. See Charles E. McLure, Jr. (1984); George N. Carlson and Harvey Galper (1984) 
and Alicia H. Munnell (1992).
43. Section 162 o f  the 1991 Budget Bill.
44. See Jeffrey P. Sherman (1991).
45. See the 1994 Multistate Corporate Tax Guide.
46. The UDITPA (Uniform Distribution o f Income for Tax Purposes Act) approach 
is to  allocate only non-business income. This latter is defined as originating in assets 
not in use for daily business activities.
47. The O hio Board o f  Tax Appeals has ruled that the “aggregate” or (c o n d u it)  prin­
ciple applies to the computation o f the franchise tax. This means that all incom e and 
deductions realized by a partnership are transplanted as such to the c o rp o ra te  part­
ner for the calculation o f  its franchise tax.
48. For example, businesses with distribution services among different local govern­
ments in theory need to keep track o f how long a truck and driver spends in each ju­
risdiction in the course o f  a day.
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49. We are grateful to the Department of Taxation for making the data available. The 
sample of tax returns and the micro-simulation methodology are described in the 
Appendix.
50. Of course, this principle should not apply only to incorporated businesses but 
rather to all types of legal forms of enterprises.
51 The proposals from the business community with respect to the repeal of the net 
worth tax have not been necessarily consistent in the sense that they factor both the 
proposition of revenue neutrality and a reformed net worth tax with a cap and other 
features (e.g. lower rates) which may make revenue neutrality impossible.
52. The proposal from the business community also suggests that the maximum cap in 
the schedule should be used for a combined group. However, the rationale of the tax 
as a minimum payment for services or the privilege to do business in the state suggests 
that each corporation in a combined group should pay this type of tax separately.
53. See M. Wasylenko, “The Role of Fiscal Incentives in Economic Development: 
How Ohio Stands Relative to Its Competitor States,” Chapter 9 in this volume.
54. UDITPA adopts the three factors formula with equal weights for sales, payroll 
and property.
55. However, nationwide there does not appear to be significant over apportion­
ment. See Steven M. Sheffin and Jack Fulcher (1984).
56. See for example, James F. Buresh and Marc S. Weinstein (1982).
57. Often the second-stage apportionment is not done with the entire income ap­
portioned to the state assessed to the “key corporation” of the group in the state.
58. Several administrative issues would also need to be addressed, involving rules for 
the consolidation of intercompany transactions, the merging of different accounting 
periods, how to address partnerships in the affiliated group, how to deal with foreign 
source income, and whether there should be some modification of the apportion­
ment formula to recognize the different nature of some of the corporations, such as 
financial institutions and insurance companies.
59. By efficiency what is meant is that the residents of some jurisdictions may have 
higher preferences for public services, and the system of local finances should let 
these jurisdictions fulfill these preferences on a voluntary basis.
60. Michigan does not have a corporate income tax, but it has a “single business tax,” 
which is a modified value-added tax (VAT).
